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Abstract 
Sweden has for a long time distinguished itself as a major player among few other 
generous and inclusive welfare states. The Swedish welfare system is characterised by 
the universal principles based on the idea that all legitimate inhabitants are eligible for 
welfare support in order to promote overall solidarity among citizens. This generous 
position changed rapidly in 2015 when there was a peak in asylum seekers. Temporary 
residence permits and identity checks along the border were implemented with a short 
notice. This thesis sets out to examine how official political discourse in Sweden 
pertaining to its inclusive welfare system in regard to refugees has changed 
significantly between 2015 and 2016. To achieve this aim, the study critically analyses 
political speeches by Stefan Löfven and Anna Kinberg Batra who are the party leaders 
of the two most influential mainstream parties in Sweden, namely the Social 
Democrats and Moderaterna. By conducting a documentary analysis using the 
analytical strategy of critical discourse analysis, political speeches can be studied. The 
theoretical framework builds upon the concepts of welfare chauvinism the theory as a 
frame for how mainstream parties relate to the issues such as having an inclusive 
immigration policy and granting the same welfare entitlements to immigrants. The 
concepts of the critical discourse analysis such as micro- and macro levels are also used 
in order to trace various layers in the changing discourses. The results of the study 
reveal that there have been fluctuations in the value words of the Swedish society in 
the official discourse regarding inclusive welfare for refugees. It becomes evident that 
the Social Democrats and Moderaterna to some extent adapt welfare chauvinistic 
claims, it is not that apparent in their speeches as it is in the implemented laws and 
regulations.  
 
Key words: Sweden, welfare state, refugee, asylum-seeker, EU, solidarity, 
togetherness, deservingness, equality, critical discourse analysis, folkhemmet, the 
‘Swedish model’, inclusion, exclusion, welfare chauvinism.  
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1. Introduction 
Sweden is a moderately populated nation compared to other European countries 
and into the 20th century the population was quite homogeneous with less than one 
percent foreign-born citizens (Eger, 2009). Swedes perceived themselves as being very 
alike and equal. Due to this perception, they were prepared to share the pain of 
upcoming problems. They were ‘all in the same boat’. As Sweden’s population got 
more diversified, it got harder to uphold the idea of sharing the pain equally among 
its residents. Consequently, one can argue that this might become problematic since it 
was the feeling of ‘togetherness’ that contributed to the development of the most 
generous welfare state in the world (ibid). 
Sweden is considered to be one of the most egalitarian, humanitarian and 
democratic countries in the world (Borevi, 2012; Schierup & Ålund, 2011). All 
inhabitants are used to high standards of living, universal health care, free education, 
and generous unemployment benefits. Moreover, Sweden has had (and still has) a 
very good reputation internationally when it comes to welfare standards and inclusion 
of vulnerable groups. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s index of 
democracy (2017), Sweden is ranked as one of the most democratic countries in the 
world, not just because of high participation in national elections but, rather because 
Swedish economic and social policies have reflected a desire to include marginalized 
populations (Eger, 2009). 
However, with an increasing immigration to Sweden it becomes obvious that the 
fundamental principles of this longstanding inclusive welfare state have been put into 
question. The relationship between the welfare state and migration has always been 
tense, where increased migration tends to affect the conditions to pass on and develop 
the welfare model. The tension between the welfare state and migration is rooted in 
the so-called ‘social contract’ between the state and its inhabitants. In other words, in 
the same way that the state has responsibilities towards its citizens, citizens have 
obligations towards the state, such as paying taxes or complying with the legislation 
of the country (Marshall, 1963; Dølvik et al. 2014). Since 2015 and the increased influx 
of refugees to the EU, Sweden and other Nordic countries have faced several concerns 
and dilemmas linked to the issues of which are to be included into the welfare state. 
These concerns differ for each of the Nordic countries, depending on the challenges in 
relation to various categories of immigrants and the reasons for their migration as well 
as the luggage they bring with them. An example of this would be the issues of 
competence, trauma and health problems (Dølvik et al. 2014). 
The relationship between migration and the welfare state can be understood as 
being dynamic. Firstly, the welfare states put forward important premises for 
migration policy, and at the same time, welfare policy has very important 
consequences for migrants’ everyday lives. Secondly, the behaviours and actions of 
migrants influence the welfare state since migrants both produce and consume welfare 
goods. In all of the Nordic welfare states (Sweden is not an exception) migrants are 
perceived as representing cultural diversity and in some circumstances, they are 
perceived as a ‘burden’, since they in many cases require special needs (Brochmann & 
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Hagelund, 2012). In other words, migrants do to some extent challenge the work forms 
of the welfare state and the fundamental legitimacy of the community.  
Historically, Sweden is not generally thought of as a country of immigration. Until 
the early 20th century Sweden was one of the major emigrant countries, and this 
situation changed rapidly following the Second World War (Dahlstedt & Neergaard, 
2016). Currently, Sweden is characterized by ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity. 
The transformation from a homogeneous society towards a heterogeneous society has 
happened in a very short period of time. In present time, Sweden together with 
Germany has been one of the largest receivers of refugees compared to other EU 
countries. 
Migration issues have nowadays become a phenomenon of national importance 
which has led to intense debates among Swedish politicians, as well as within the 
broader Swedish society. For instance, one of the current debates regards the 
accumulation of many newly arrived refugees to the peripheries of the Swedish larger 
cities. In other words, refugees are often placed in segregated and poor areas. This in 
turn has led to debates on the threats to national security (Dahlstedt & Neergaard, 
2016). Debates on national security have yet again led to the targeting of suburban 
areas in search for potential terrorists. In the public debate, the city periphery is 
described as a ‘culture of violence’, representing a vital threat to Sweden’s core values 
and a fear that the ‘patriarchal culture’ may spread to other urban areas as well (ibid).  
This quick transformation has prompted the Swedish government to, not only pass 
new legislation to protect minority groups from discrimination, but also to sharpen 
asylum regulations, and the laws relating to asylum seekers and their families (Nilsson 
& Nyström, 2016).  
Unlike before, when most of the immigrants to Sweden were labour migrants, the 
majority of those who arrive today constitute political refugees. During 2015, Sweden 
received 162 877 asylum applications, in contrast to 2016 when it was a substantial 
decrease with “only” 28 939 applications. 2015 stands out significantly compared to 
2013 and 2014 as well. In 2013, there were approximately 60 000 and in 2014 there were 
approximately 80 000 asylum applications1 (Swedish migration agency, 2017).    
There are several factors that have affected the substantial reduction of 
applications during 2016. For instance, there might have been fewer people fleeing 
(which is not credible since UNCHR’s forecast from January 2016 shows the opposite) 
or, like in the case of Sweden, more restrictive laws were implemented, such as the 
introduction of the temporary residence permits, border controls and identity checks.  
Nowadays and until 2019 (this time period will probably be extended) it is not possible 
for newly arrived refugees to receive a permanent residence permit for newly arrived 
refugees and it is very hard to obtain refugee status (Regeringskansliet, 2015b).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See figure 1 in the appendix.  
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1.1. Research Problem 
Given this background, it is important to pay a closer attention to the major 
changes in the Swedish welfare- and migration discourse as well as Swedish laws- and 
regulations since 2015 due to the growing inflow of refugees. This thesis argues that it 
is highly important to study changing discourse as a critical analysis of political 
debates and statements, as it provides us with rather powerful insights into the 
everyday manifestations and displays of social problems in interaction and depiction 
of social change (van Dijk, 1985). Asylum and refugee issues have recently been 
presented to the Swedish society as acute social problems (Regeringskansliet, 2015b). 
Thus, the main point of this study is to examine how refugees and asylum seekers are 
constructed as social problems to be solved through official discourse. In doing so, this 
study argues that, discourses are not only mere expressions of social practice, they also 
exercise power in a society because they institutionalize and regulate ways of how 
people are talking, thinking and acting in relation to various social and political issues 
(van Dijk, 1985; Jäger & Maier, 2009:35; Cameron & Panovic, 2014). 
Previous research on migration and welfare has largely focused on the political 
struggles between the mainstream- and right wing/populist parties (Eastmond, 2011; 
Schierup & Ålund, 2011; Hinnfors et al., 2012; Norocel, 2016). In this thesis, it is the 
mainstream parties in Sweden at the time of increased immigration that are the focus. 
More specifically, the thesis analyses how the Social Democrats (SAP) and Moderaterna 
adapt/relate to welfare chauvinistic claims promulgated by the right wing/populist 
political opponents in the political speeches and policies regarding refugees. The 
concept of welfare chauvinism is applied as it reveals the mechanism of boundary-
drawing, and the discourse under consideration embraces the tension between 
inclusion and exclusion in the welfare state (de Koster et al. 2012). It is therefore 
relevant to study whether welfare chauvinistic concepts have become more prominent 
in the official discourse since the increased influx of refugees during 2015. The study 
will also illustrate how the Swedish leading parties legitimize the minimum of the EU 
levels of refugee inclusion when Sweden’s welfare state faces challenges. 
 There is a research gap connected to the welfare state and how Swedish parties 
relate to welfare chauvinism as previous research has been concerned with the 
influence of the Swedish Democrats (SD) by analysing their election manifesto. This 
study attempts to provide a new perspective, and deeper insight into the inclusive 
welfare state and refugees by analysing political speeches and election manifestos. 
This study is also highly relevant in the broader European context because 
migration is a highly-debated issue among all the EU member states and it has become 
a ‘matter of common interest’. Several changes regarding refugee reception and equal 
distribution among the EU member state have taken place recently. Within the 
European context, the Swedish asylum- and refugee policies have been fairly 
unrestrictive and they have been coupled with quite fast and straightforward 
possibilities for naturalization. Sweden was one of the first countries within the 
European Union to adopt a liberal multicultural integration policy in 1975. The policy 
formulated a strategy for a more multicultural society based on equality, freedom of 
choice and co-operation. This study will contribute to the field of European studies for 
the reason that Sweden decided to adapt to the EU minimum requirements on refugee 
policies in 2015. The shift towards the EU venue on asylum matters has allowed policy 
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makers to develop more restrictive provisions on asylum, which is now current in 
Sweden. The principle of solidarity has since the Lisbon Treaty been an important 
objective for the common EU policy on immigration. This study will provide us with 
a new understanding of solidarity and how solidarity has a tendency to change 
meaning depending on context.  
 
  
1.1.2. Aim and Research Questions 
The aim of this research is to get a deeper understanding of the rapid and profound 
transformation, taking place in the Swedish official political discourse regarding 
welfare rights and entitlements for refugees since 2015.  
Subsequently, this study will proceed from a broader research question: 
 
✓ How has the political discourse regarding welfare inclusion of refugees 
and asylum seekers changed since the autumn 2015 until 2016? 
More specifically, the thesis will answer the following questions: 
 
o What kind of discursive changes took place between solidarity 
and nationalistic claims within the official discourse on the 
Swedish welfare state? 
o How does a shift towards limiting migration represent the 
discursive claims of the welfare chauvinism?  
 
1.1.3. Limitations 
This research will scrutinize political speeches that were held between the summer 
2015 and the summer 2016, more specifically held by the Swedish Prime minister 
Stefan Löfven who is the party leader of the Social Democrats and by the leader of the 
liberal party (Moderaterna), Anna Kinberg Batra. These political speeches raise 
concerns for the Swedish welfare in relation the increased influx of refugees since 2015 
and the challenges confronted by the Swedish society. The speeches highlight some 
central arguments in the current official discourse in relation to welfare inclusion of 
refugees and asylum seekers. The chosen time period 2015-08-16 to 2016-06-06 is 
relevant to this study since the immigration flow had become greater at this point in 
time and the Government then chose to declare and implement several restrictive 
measures. The chosen time period from which the material is selected is rather short, 
yet it allows for an insight into the quick transformation in the political domain that is 
taking place during this period. Following this objective, I found no additional value 
in analysing material long before the so-called ‘refugee crisis’. I have chosen to focus 
on the specific speeches and temporary laws and base the analysis of them on the 
theoretical framework of welfare chauvinism  
I have decided to focus on the largest and most influential Swedish Political parties 
during the chosen period of time, i.e. The Social Democrats and Moderaterna2. I chose 
to focus on these parties since I would argue that they have the biggest impact on 
                                                 
2 While writing this thesis in spring of 2017, the political supremacy of Moderaterna has dramatically changed 
and they have now much less support than during the period of the current study.  
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formulating and constituting the current policies regarding welfare and refugees 
during the particular time-period. I have actively decided not to include material from 
populist parties3, since my aim is to analyse how mainstream parties relate to welfare 
chauvinistic claims.  For that reason, it is not interesting to investigate the discursive 
stance/changes of populist parties. 
 
1.2. Outline of the Thesis 
Following the introduction chapter, I provide a background to the research 
problem and the aim and research questions are presented. Later on, the previous 
studies dealing with the question of ‘the Swedish model’ and the universal welfare 
state will be presented. The following section introduces a subject of the political 
conflict, which in this thesis stands for the mainstreams parties’ inclination to adapt 
the principle ideas of welfare chauvinism when it comes to refugees’ access to welfare. 
This chapter is followed by the theoretical framework where welfare chauvinism is 
explained in detail and issues of the welfare state and deservingness are theorized in 
relation to refugees. The methodology chapter describes the overall research design 
and methodological tools used in this research. The methodology chapter presents the 
method and its dis/advantages as well as the empirical material that the thesis 
analyses.  Furthermore, the results and the critical discourse analysis of my empirical 
material are presented in chapter five. The final chapter presents the main conclusions, 
final discussion and the suggestions for future research.  
 
1.3. Asylum as a EU ‘Matter of Common Importance’ 
The development of the EU’s common asylum policy started outside the European 
Community’s (EC) setting. This cooperation developed within the framework of the 
Ad Hoc Group on Migration which was established in 1986. This establishment was 
the starting point for the Dublin Convention, adopted in 1990. The Convention 
determines the state responsible for examining an application for asylum lodged in 
one of the Member States of the EC. The Convention also facilitates for Third Country 
Nationals (TCN) to stay and travel within the EU. During the 1990s and a few years 
later, when the Convention was implemented, the European States were experiencing 
a peak in asylum applications and one reason of this peak was the outbreak of the war 
in the former Yugoslavia (Eastmond, 2011). Later on, the Treaty of Maastricht formally 
brought this existing pattern of intergovernmental cooperation into the EU’s 
institutional framework. From then on, asylum was seen as one of the nine “matters 
of common interest” in Justice and Home Affairs. Since this point in time it has possible 
to observe an increase in supranational governance in a policy area that traditionally 
was seen as intergovernmental with a high focus on national sovereignty. Moreover, 
‘matters of common interest’ are to be dealt with in compliance with the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees – known as the Geneva Convention. (Kaunert & Léonard, 2012).  
In the creation of a common EU asylum policy, the Member States remained the 
dominant actors. The effect of the EU measures, on the other hand, was mainly to be 
understood as a ‘soft law’ instrument, including recommendations and solutions. In 
                                                 
3The Swedish Democrats (SD) and the party leader Jimmy Åkesson.  
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the early stage of the development of a common asylum policy there was a major focus 
on ‘burden sharing’ and it aimed at promoting a balance of efforts amongst the 
Member States. Furthermore, The Dublin II Regulation was adopted in 2003 and 
established the criteria and mechanisms for shaping the Member States 
responsibilities. The main goal of this re-newed agreement was to ensure that asylum-
seekers had access to an asylum procedure in one of the EU Member States. This 
regulation, furthermore, replaces and addresses some shortages of the Dublin 
Convention, for instance, it establishes a hierarchy of criteria, in which the main 
principle underpinning the system is that “the State responsible for processing an 
application is the State responsible for the asylum-seeker’s presence in the EU, that is, 
the State through which an asylum-seeker has entered the EU” (Kaunert & Léonard, 
2012:11).  
The Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in December 2009 and it enabled the EU to 
adopt measures on a uniform status of asylum valid throughout the Union, a uniform 
status of subsidiary protection and a common system of temporary protection 
amongst others. After the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU adopted the Stockholm Programme 
which was in line with the tradition of adopting five-year working programmes for 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). The Stockholm Programme is the 
third AFSJ programme for the period 2010-2014, and envisions the establishment of “a 
common area of protection and solidarity based on a common asylum procedure and 
a uniform status for those granted international protection” (Kaunert & Léonard, 
2012:17).  
The principle of solidarity has since the Lisbon Treaty been an important objective 
for the common EU policy on immigration. In other words, immigration policies are 
to be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility. In 2014, 
the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the situation in the Mediterranean 
and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration. This instructed the EU 
Committee on Civil Liberties and Justice and Home Affairs to draft an initiative report. 
The report was adopted in April 2016 and included eight Working Documents which 
focused on different aspects of migration and asylum policy. Some of the issues 
pointed out in the report are that need to develop adequate legal economic migration 
channels, a strategy on cooperation with the third countries and an effective 
implementation of the Common European Asylum System (Kaunert & Léonard, 2012; 
European Parliament, 2016; European Parliament, 2017). 
 
1.4. Dublin Convention as an Unsuccessful project? 
Asylum-seekers and refugees have been an object of heated debates in the whole 
of Europe for a long time and it became particularly evident in the wake of the so-
called Arab Spring. Talks about refugees and the ‘refugee crisis’ culminated in the 
French and Italian Governments re-introducing border controls in spring 2011. All 
around Europe, legislation regarding refugees has become restrictive with an aim to 
reduce the increasing flows of asylum seekers and protect the territories of the nation 
states. The EU, however, has played an important role in this policy area when it comes 
to the extent to which the Member States remain in control of their national asylum 
and migration policies. The EU has had a great influence over national policies since 
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the attempts to move beyond the minimum standards to adopt a common asylum 
standard. (Kaunert & Léonard, 2011). 
The shift to the EU venue on asylum matters has allowed policy makers to develop 
more restrictive provisions on asylum, which we currently witness in Sweden and in 
many other EU countries. There has been an improvement of asylum policy-making 
in various EU Member States since these issues were taken on as the EU’s common 
concern and asylum and immigration have gained importance as an area for closer 
cooperation among the EU member states. It is, however, International Law that sets 
the general standards for asylum processing within the EU, meaning that refugees 
within the EU must be able to have their claims assessed on the requirement of 
International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law. In other words, the EU has a 
mandate to protect refugees and human rights. The harmonization of asylum matters 
aims to avoid refugee flows between the Member States based solely on the differing 
levels of protection and obligations assumed under international human rights and 
refugee law (Ljungholm, 2014). 
Yet, it can be argued that this ambitious theoretical framework was not put into 
practice successfully. The Dublin Convention is an example of an unsuccessful EU 
project with a poor outcome. Europe’s Dublin system has been the subject of intense 
political debate and criticism since its inception. On the one hand, it has been 
acclaimed as the cornerstone of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). On 
the other hand, it has been reviled as a failure of solidarity and burden-sharing among 
EU member states (Fratzke, 2015). The truth is that the idea of the Dublin system was 
not designed to equalise or share the burden of asylum seekers. Instead, it was rather 
intended to create a mechanism that swiftly assigns responsibility for processing an 
individual’s asylum application to a single Member State. The Dublin regulation has, 
however, been failing to achieve its primary goals, there has been low effective transfer 
rates and a high rate of secondary movement among asylum seekers, so-called ‘asylum 
shopping’ which was one of the intentions of the Regulation to elude. The transfer of 
asylum-processing responsibilities from northern Europe to southern Europe, has 
similarly received harsh criticism (ibid).  
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2. Previous Studies 
The starting point for this research was Deservingness in the Danish Context: Welfare 
Chauvinism in times of crisis by Martin Bak Jørgensen and Trine Lund Thomsen (2016), 
conducted with an aim to study categories of deservingness in social policy. It also 
investigates welfare chauvinism in relation to social security benefits for refugees in 
Denmark. This study served as the main inspiration for my work and I apply theories 
and concepts used in the study, including theories on welfare regimes, 
multiculturalism, immigration policy and solidarity, to the context of Scandinavian 
states in general. Furthermore, I have used the results of the previous research on 
welfare inclusiveness of refugees, built on the concepts of discourse, folkhemmet and 
mainstream parties’ adaption of populist parties’ programme.  
 
2.1. The Origins of the ‘Swedish model’ 
During the late 1920s the Social Democrats launched a vision of ‘the people’s 
home’ (folkhemmet), which had strong connections with the image of the Swedish 
society as a family. This thought was first launched by the political right sphere. 
However, during the same period more ‘neutral’ concepts such as democracy, 
citizenship and modernity gained their prominence. Throughout the 1920s the Social 
Democrats succeeded in their welfare state project and there was a growing sense 
among the Swedish population of a common national identity. The main reason for 
this success was the Social Democrats’ ability to formulate a communitarian vision of a 
society. 
The idea of folkhemmet contained biological as well as other excluding elements. 
There were several policies directed towards national minorities with assimilative 
traits, where ‘turning a person into a Swede’ was an explicit or implicit aim. It is 
difficult to deny that there existed expectations regarding what one should be like or 
how one should act as a Swedish citizen. Scholars such as Borevi (2012) and Schall 
(2016) have been arguing that the concept of folkhemmet involved a homogenising zeal 
directed against those who were thought to diverge from the norm. Moreover, the 
reason why Sweden developed such a strong universalistic welfare state was also 
attributed to Sweden’s ethnic homogeneity. 
During 1920s the idea of folkhemmet was highly successful, and later on became 
entirely linked with the ideals of social democracy, where the primary image of 
folkhemmet was an image of harmony and solidarity (Schall, 2016). 
 
2.2. The Establishment of the Universal Welfare State 
The welfare state that was established in Sweden after World War II can more or 
less be understood as an integration project with an aim to promote national cohesion 
and solidarity. On the other hand, as Nilsson and Nyström (2016) argue the Swedish 
model was achieved as an institutional framework with a purpose to promote 
modernization and a flexible adaption to the surrounding world, and its rapid 
changes. Regardless of what reason, Sweden has since distinguished itself as a major 
player among few other generous and inclusive welfare states.  
As mentioned previously, the Swedish welfare model is characterised by universal 
principles, based on the idea that a welfare policy includes all inhabitants in order to 
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promote overall solidarity among citizens, rather than a policy that selectively focuses 
on certain categories of society. To uphold national solidarity and the idea of a 
universalistic welfare state, it is required that the majority of the population supports 
the idea of a fair distribution of goods. This in turn presupposes that a certain feeling 
of belonging and solidarity exists among the inhabitants. (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 
Borevi, 2012; Nilsson & Nyström, 2016).   
In 1975, a multicultural policy was launched by the Swedish parliament. Until then 
there was a general understanding that Swedish welfare policies involved an ambition 
to make people adapt to a common national Swedish norm. Sweden was, compared 
to other European countries early in formulating a policy response towards 
immigration. This new immigration policy encouraged cultural diversity, but a new 
goal of freedom of choice was formulated as well, meaning that, immigrants’ private 
sphere should be left alone. Moreover, multiculturalism refers to the attempts to 
integrate various categories of immigrants into the host society and immigrants were 
also given an opportunity to keep and develop their traditional culture and lifestyle.  
Furthermore, this new immigration policy had to take into account that welfare 
policies in Sweden were formulated in accordance with a universal welfare model. In 
contrast to the selective welfare model, the former of the two means that the whole 
population is entitled to the state support. Within the selective model, only the poorest 
part of the population has access to welfare support. In other words, the universal 
welfare model is rooted in the idea that integration is promoted by making the welfare 
for all a common concern. One of the underlying issues of welfare as a common 
concern for the whole population is that it makes it easier to avoid stigmatisation of 
those who receive support and benefits (Runblom, 1994; Borevi, 2012).  
Nilsson and Nyström (2016:173-4) highlight that one of the fundamental thoughts 
about the Swedish model was to push for structural change after the post-war period, 
and to promote movement of people from agricultural- to urban areas. There is, 
according to Nilsson and Nyström (2016), a myth that the welfare state and the 
movement of people are contradicting each other.  The authors argue that the Swedish 
model and the welfare state are developed to respond to the challenges that are to 
some extent similar to those we face today. As a result of increased immigration, they 
underline, problems that already existed in the Swedish society and are to some extent 
independent of increased immigration, have been brought up to the surface.   
 
2.3. Development of Refugee Policies in Sweden since the 
1960s 
When we look closer at how refugee policy developed in Sweden prior to 2015 it 
might be illuminating to discover that despite SAP’s ideology of solidarity, folkhemmet 
draws on complex legacies and issues as fear of the ‘other’, and it is described as ‘grey’ 
(Andersson, 2009). In the article “The missing factor: why social democracy can lead 
to restrictive immigration policy” Hinnfors and his colleagues (2012) highlight the SAP 
and its continuous record of supporting restrictive immigration measures since the 
1960s. It is important to mention that this article mostly emphasises the entry 
regulations to Sweden. Moreover, the article shows that SAP believes that folkhemmet has 
limited ability to make room for immigrants. These findings are counter-intuitive since 
the usual ideology of social democracy includes solidarity and inclusiveness of all 
 10 
 
members of society. Given this clear ideological stand one would expect more 
generous policies regarding immigration, especially when addressing the needs of 
refugees and asylum seekers. It is interesting however that the SAP is the only 
mainstream party with a steady record of supporting strict entry policies, while several 
non-socialist parties have been in opposition to these policies during the years.  In 1991 
when SAP lost the parliamentary election and the non-socialist took office, they 
implemented a more open refugee admission policy, against a strong opposition from 
SAP (Hinnfors et al., 2012).  
Following Hinnfors et al. (2012) it is possible to argue that it is the ideology of SAP 
that allows them to formulate more restrictive immigration policies. As discussed 
earlier in this chapter, social democracy is rooted in ideological beliefs, such as 
solidarity and redistribution among the population. Since the creation of the SAP, they 
have aimed for a society built on mutual trust between the citizens, but most 
importantly, to remain a strong and universal welfare state. Despite that SAP has 
strong roots in folkhemmet there are no direct links existing between folkhemmet and 
restrictive policies, even if the ideological notions about ‘Swedishness’ might render 
strict immigration policies. Themes such as ‘Swedishness’, folkhemmet and the 
‘Swedish model’ might however create uncertainty about ‘the other’ (ibid:588pp).  
Regarding refugee and asylum policies, Sweden has internationally been 
portrayed as a ‘bastion of open asylum policies’ (Perlmutter, 1996:385). Prior to 
November 2015, Sweden’s Aliens Act regulated three types of asylum statutes in 
Sweden; refugee, persons deemed in need of subsidiary protection, and persons in need of other 
protection. The 24th of November 2015 the Government announced that Sweden would 
align its asylum policy with that of the rest of the EU by limiting the number of 
grounds for asylum to include only refugees and persons in need of subsidiary 
protection. A person deemed in need of subsidiary protection is defined as “a foreigner […] 
because there is a well-founded reason to believe that the foreigner would be at risk of 
being punished by death or be subjected to corporal punishment […]”. A person in need 
of other protection is defined as “a foreigner […] need of protection due to external or 
internal military conflict, or because of other tensions in the country […]” (Aliens Act, 
2005:716, 2016:752).  
The issue regarding refugee and asylum policies have however been highly 
dynamic over the past four decades. The SAP stands out as a key actor shaping 
increasingly restrictive refugee policy. Some examples on restrictive policies during 
the years are the implementation of temporary protection in the late 1980s but also the 
legislation making it possible for differential treatment of refugees based on the 
country of origin (Hinnfors et al., 2012).  
During the time when the SAP has been the leading party in Sweden there existed 
both ‘High’ and ‘Low’ levels of right wing populist parties, which proves that 
restrictive policies do not correlate with ‘high’ or ‘low’ levels of right wing populist 
parties, SAP’s policies have been restrictive throughout. Thus, the driving force behind 
policies of SAP, most likely depend on the ideological stand on folkhemmet (ibid). 
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2.4. Is Heterogeneity Compatible with Solidarity of Welfare 
State? 
Some scholars, most prominently Alesina and Glaeser (2004) argue contrary to 
Nilsson and Nyström (2016) that solidarity within a welfare state can be weakened as 
a result of increasing ethnic heterogeneity. Growing ethnic diversity, according to the 
authors, might force welfare states in Europe to reduce social spending, as a result, 
welfare states might need to adopt a system more similar to the USA model. Further, 
Alesina and Glaeser (2004) believe that increased diversity within societies become 
problematic since the willingness to show solidarity depends on whether social 
welfare provision is organized within a homogeneous community or whether it will 
extend beyond the boundaries of this homogenous community. 
Several other scholars, regarding the relationship between heterogeneity and 
welfare state solidarity, for instance Hjerm and Schnabel (2012) in the article “How 
much heterogeneity can the welfare state endure? The influence of heterogeneity on 
attitudes to the welfare state”, indicate that there is a general notion that heterogeneity 
often is seen as a threat to the existence of the welfare state since it challenges the 
consensus on the basic institutions and the redistributive instruments. Scandinavian 
states are historically homogenous and based on taxation which provides a basis for 
societal redistribution where “one must contribute according to one’s ability and be 
able to enjoy according to one’s need” (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012:7). In other 
words, Scandinavian states are perceived to be strong welfare systems. On the other 
hand, there are countries such as Peru and Guatemala who have a history of 
heterogeneity but also a history of weak welfare systems. Other research reveals that 
there is a tendency that people are more inclined to concede rights and welfare benefits 
to their own group or to persons that are perceived as being the same. According to 
Coenders and Scheepers (2008), it is not generally migration per se that affects the 
public attitudes towards refugees and access to welfare, neither is it the actual level of 
ethnic competition. Negative attitudes can rather be attributed to the increasing 
numbers of refugees over time. 
Sweden has traditionally been acclaimed as an inclusive society that defends 
human rights and multiculturalism by opening up its doors for those who seek asylum 
and a new life. In other words, the Swedish welfare regime appears somewhat 
exceptional, and from an international perspective, is seen as the model of a tolerant 
and egalitarian multicultural welfare society, a so-called ‘exceptionalist’ model for 
other states to follow. Today, this exceptionalism seems to fade away as since the 
middle of 2015, the former generous and inclusive refugee policies are contested by 
more restrictive policies on migration (Dahlstedt & Neergaard, 2016:2). Scholars such 
as Schierup and Ålund (1991) stress that Sweden as a multicultural society was at first 
thought as a solidarity project with an aim to create an image of Sweden as not only 
being an equal society in terms of class and gender, but also successful concerning the 
situation of migrants. Furthermore, in a later work, Schierup and Ålund (2011) argue 
that more restrictive policies on migration signal the end for the Swedish and the so-
called ‘exceptional’ model. Dahlstedt and Neergaard (2016) maintain that the Swedish 
model has been transformed towards a new welfare regime, a regime that is less 
shaped by social democratic- and more by neoliberal features. Thus, according to the 
authors the shape of a new Swedish model is emerging with an emphasis on the duties 
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of citizens rather than on their rights. The Swedish model tends now to be more similar 
to other European countries where individual autonomy and freedom of choice are 
more prioritized than equality and redistribution of societal recourses (Dahlstedt & 
Neergaard, 2016).  
  
2.5. Who deserves welfare? A Political Struggle Between the 
Mainstream and Right Wing/Populist Parties 
Since 2015 and the increased influx of refugees in Sweden, political parties such as 
the Swedish Democrats (SD) have started to question the generosity regarding 
refugees’ inclusion into the welfare state.  
Even though the SD continues to have quite marginal formal power within the 
Swedish government, the influence of SD can more or less be understood as holding 
the balance of power between the right-wing and the centre-left-wing blocs. Since their 
entrance to the parliament, the SD has been formally excluded from the political arena. 
It is however arguable whether both the right-wing parties and the Social Democrats 
have toyed with the rhetoric similar to that of the SD – especially in the context of the 
refugee situation in Europe and Sweden since 2015 (Dahlstedt & Neergaard, 2016).  
One intention that the SD has, is to preserve and protect the folkhemmet, which 
according to SD, is built on ‘the Swedish people’s right to develop their culture on their 
own terms’ and “Swedish welfare and the country’s wellbeing come first” (Norocel, 
2016:380). In other words, the SD assumes that Sweden needs to take care of ‘the 
Swedes’ before it strives to ‘help people in need’. Strictly speaking, the SD urges to 
reintroduce the ‘assimilation policy’ of the folkhem’s golden era, where ‘migrants shall 
adapt into the Swedish society and not the other way around’ (ibid:380). According to 
the abovementioned, the idea of the folkhemmet in their understanding contains several 
important elements of welfare chauvinism ideology, which will be discussed in detail 
in the theory chapter (Norocel, 2016).  
Furthermore, there has been an electoral rise of populist parties in almost all of the 
Western European countries. Consequently, several debates have focused on the issue 
of whether mainstream parties have adapted the rhetoric of the populist parties or not. 
In the article “Do mainstream parties adapt to the welfare chauvinism of populist 
parties” Schumacher and van Kersbergen (2016) have analysed to what extent welfare 
chauvinism has become part of the populist agenda in Denmark and the Netherlands. 
Welfare chauvinism stands in sharp contrast to the earlier neo-liberal position on the 
welfare state. Thus, populist parties can be described as chameleons changing colour 
to adapt to new political environments. For instance, populist parties in Denmark and 
Norway show an excellent example on parties acting like chameleons. In the beginning 
explicitly anti-welfare, but when the mainstream parties started to cut down on social 
policies they transformed into zealous defenders of the welfare state, and argued that 
immigrants make excessive use of the welfare state (Schumacher & van Kersbergen, 
2016:300).   
Thus, the solution for the populist parties was to adhere to the ideas of welfare 
chauvinism. In other words, their conviction is that the access to welfare should only 
be allowed for the ‘deserving’ natives. There are several reasons why populist parties 
embrace welfare chauvinism. Scholars such as Abts and Rummens (2007), Barr (2009) 
and Canovan (1999) stress that the heart of populism concerns the conflict between the 
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homogenous and unified common people and an enemy that consists of a divisive 
political, economic and cultural elite, in which a dangerous and threatening ‘other’ is 
added. The ‘other’ is consequently deemed unable to meet the ‘Swedish ideal’ such as 
gender equality and women’s emancipation. For this reason, the ‘other’ is perceived 
as dangerous for the Swedish society. Thus, the content of populist parties’ 
programmes often depends on who is identified as the elite, and to what extent a 
dangerous ‘other’ is specified (Schumacher & van Kersbergen, 2016:302; Norocel, 
2016:375). 
Recently, many of the Western European countries have experienced a reduction 
of welfare benefits and tightening of eligibility conditions of social welfare provisions, 
where the reduction has been for both natives and refugees. This generates high level 
of anxiety among voters, who in many cases depend on social services. In turn, there 
is a strong demand for political protection of social security, which provokes responses 
from the mainstream parties. The question is though how do they respond to the issues 
concerning welfare chauvinism or do they ignore the populist parties that take such a 
position? 
Nowadays populist parties in Western Europe not only promote a monocultural 
society and a stop to European integration, but also the maintenance of a generous 
welfare state for the ‘deserving’ native population. Briefly, populist parties that are 
taking a welfare chauvinistic position most likely blame the elite for cutting the welfare 
rights of deserving ‘natives’ and the non-natives for their excessive claims on the 
welfare state. One clear example on this standpoint is Marine Le Pen (Le Monde, 2011), 
who stated4: “We must reserve our welfare and our social policy for our compatriots 
[…]”. Her aim, according to Rydgren (2008:173) is to “promote feelings of xenophobic 
welfare chauvinism by depicting immigrants as lazy parasites living on state 
subsidies”.  
There are several ways that mainstreams parties within a welfare state can respond 
to populist parties taking a welfare chauvinistic position. Since welfare chauvinism is 
linked to welfare and multiculturalism, it is relevant to identify how mainstream 
parties change on these two issues when welfare chauvinism emerges. According to 
Schumacher and van Kersbergen (2016:302), mainstream parties can either 
accommodate, attack or ignore the standing of the populist party. If a mainstream party 
chooses to accommodate, it will take the same welfare chauvinistic position as populist 
parties. Attack, happens when the mainstream parties prioritize issues such as 
equality, universalism or speak positively about multiculturalism. Moreover, when 
mainstream parties choose to ignore the populist parties it is not possible to observe 
any changes in the mainstream party’s position on welfare or multiculturalism. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
4 Translation by Schumancher & Kersberg (2016). 
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3. Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical chapter is divided into two sections: the first section will present 
the key ideas underlying the theory of Welfare Chauvinism. This theory will provide 
a tool for categorising arguments concerning inclusive or welfare chauvinistic 
preferences being expressed in political speeches. The second section introduces the 
concepts of structures of discourses and critical discourse analysis, which provide a 
tool for understanding different dimensions of discourse analysis and give the 
researcher instruments to analyse the relations between power and discourse.   
 
3.1. Welfare Chauvinism 
Access to welfare for refugees and asylum seekers is debated among all the 
political parties in Sweden and to understand the root causes of this debate it is 
necessary to understand the relationship nexus welfare-refugees. The potential conflict 
proceeds from the principles of the so-called ‘social contract’ between the welfare state 
and its citizens, which contains duties and rights. On the one hand, the welfare state 
has responsibilities towards its citizens. It must be able to provide welfare and citizens 
have the right to access support. Simultaneously, for citizens to be granted welfare 
entitlements, they must fulfil certain duties, such as pay taxes and contribute to the 
society (Marshall, 1963). Access to welfare can be designated as a subject to political 
recognition that is based on assumptions of deservingness of the recipient. There is, 
however an important aspect of the social contract, bringing a conditionality to non-
citizens’ social rights, in other words, refugees are not considered to be members of 
the community and thus are subjected to further requirements (Marshall, 1963:71-2,84; 
Sainsbury, 2012:11, 136).  
Universal welfare states, such as Sweden are usually defined as inclusive by the 
generous recognition of refugees’ social rights, especially in comparison with non-
universal states that tend to facilitate the welfare-refugee relationship characterised by 
requirements and conditions. Although Sweden is conceived as an inclusive welfare 
state in terms of policy outcomes, earlier research such as Hinnfors et al. (2012), detects 
excluding forces in political debates that have led to restrictive policies regarding 
refugees and asylum seekers. Political parties’ preferences towards refugees/asylum 
seekers and other immigrant groups can be designated as leaning to the ideas of 
welfare chauvinism. According to Andersen and Bjørklund (1990), welfare chauvinism 
is described as the natives’ unwillingness to grant the same welfare entitlements to 
immigrants as to nationals a country. The concept refers to a protective stance that is 
based on the assumption that access to welfare should be enjoyed by the assumed ‘us’ 
at the expense of the assumed ‘them’, and not the other way around. Kitschelt (1997), 
however, argues that welfare chauvinism can be referred to an understanding of the 
welfare state as; “a system of social protection for those who belong to the ethnically 
defined community and who have contributed to it” (ibid:22). Historically, the term 
welfare chauvinism was used to explain the emergence of right-wing populist parties 
in the context of the transformation of the Western European party system. Generally, 
most of these parties are in support of the welfare state, though with an exclusionary 
understanding of who should benefit or not (Mewes & Mau, 2013). Furthermore, 
welfare chauvinism can be defined as ‘nativist resentment’ against the inclusion of 
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immigrants into the welfare system. Thus, it is not the welfare state per se that is at 
stake for welfare chauvinists. It is rather the issue of who should be included based on 
origin, ethnicity or nationality. 
 
3.2. Theorising Deservingness and the Welfare State in 
Relation to Refugees and Asylum Seekers 
A welfare state can be understood as a social arrangement with an aim to reduce 
social inequality and to manage collective risks. The current literature on welfare 
distribution points to various principles based on which citizens are entitled to various 
welfare services. One of the principles focuses on merit. According to this, citizens who 
contribute to the welfare system should be entitled to higher levels of provision. The 
second principle is need. Welfare provisions should only be allocated to those with the 
utmost need. Finally, the third principle is equality. Regardless of contribution and 
status, all citizens should be entitled to the same level of provision. Important variables 
to redistribution might also be dependent on citizenship and identity (Jørgensen & 
Thomsen, 2016:333; Mau & Burkhardt, 2009). 
In their article, Jørgensen & Thomsen (2016) discuss the notion of welfare 
chauvinism as a dynamic concept with weak and strong forms. In its extreme version, 
welfare chauvinism prefers to exclude immigrants from any welfare provision, 
whereas it, in its weaker version, however, it relegates immigrants to lower benefit 
levels or high barriers to inclusion. The authors build their argument on the question: 
“How can welfare chauvinism be legitimised as something political actors regard as 
beneficial in a universal welfare state, and even become part of a political strategy?” 
(ibid:331). They examine welfare chauvinism through an analysis of policy framework, 
political party programmes and position papers. One of the conclusions the article 
brings forward is that the weak version of welfare chauvinism is legitimised through 
eligibility criteria such as contribution used to protect the welfare system for the whole 
population. However, the strong version of welfare chauvinism is based on nativist 
resentment against the inclusion of immigrants and welfare provisions should only be 
accessible to natives (Jørgensen & Thomsen).  
‘Who should get what, and why’ (in other words, who deserves what?) has always 
been a highly-debated topic within the Danish welfare state. The conceptualisation of 
deservingness is inspired by Wim van Oorschot (2000). The author presents a number 
of criteria which create a hierarchy of deservingness. This is to say that some societal 
groups are perceived as more deserving of welfare entitlements than other groups. The 
actual need of social protection is less influential than criteria such as identity, control 
and reciprocity. The hierarchy indicates that refugees and asylum seekers are 
perceived as less deserving than native inhabitants. Since refugees do not belong to 
the principle of in-group preference, such as ‘our people’ or ‘our family’ they do not 
deserve as much as those who belong to ‘us’. In developed societies, such as Sweden, 
the in-group preference together with the criteria might result in an unwillingness to 
support needy people from ethnic minorities or foreign residents in general. The 
interplay between different criteria can, however, suggest that deservingness varies 
among migrant groups. Labour migrants for instance might deserve more welfare 
entitlements since they contribute to the society more than refugees (ibid:35). 
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3.3. Critical Discourse Analysis 
Van Dijk (2001) describes Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a type of analytical 
research that mostly studies the ways in which social power, abuse, dominance and 
inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social and 
political context. Briefly, it provides theories and methods for empirical study of the 
relations between discourse and social developments in different social domains 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) Further, CDA focuses primarily on social problems and 
political issues but also on challenges within a society, such as power relations and 
dominance.  
When conducting a CDA, it is important to be aware of the different dimensions 
of the discourse. The first dimension is the micro-level, where the use of language, 
verbal interaction and communication belong. Issues such as power, dominance and 
inequality, on the other hand, are tackled within the macro-level analysis. One of the 
aims with CDA is to bridge the gap between the abovementioned dimensions. The so-
called ‘meso-level’ (when micro- and macro are connected) can be described as a ‘one 
unified whole’ which takes place in everyday interaction. When a political speech by 
a Swedish politician regarding refugees and challenges for the welfare state is held in 
the parliament it is a discourse at the micro-level of social interaction, in the specific 
situation of a debate. Simultaneously, it may indorse or be a constituent part of 
legislation at the macro-level. Thus, this can be understood as a bridge between micro- 
and macro-level, designated as a meso-level (van Dijk, 2001:354).  
Moreover, it is highly relevant to have an understanding that discourse is an 
integral aspect of power-control, and more specifically, the social power of groups. 
Social power can be interpreted as the following: groups have power if they are able 
to control the acts and minds of other groups (Cameron & Pavovic, 2014; van Dijk, 
2001:355). This, in turn, presupposes a form of power base of privileged access to social 
resources which may include money, status, knowledge, culture and information. It is 
important to note that types of power may be distinguished according to the various 
resources employed to exercise such power. For instance, rich people will have power 
because of their money. Yet, social power, when groups control other groups, might 
only occur in certain contexts. The power of dominant groups is in some cases 
integrated in the laws, rules and norms. This takes the form of what Gramsci (1971) 
called ‘hegemony’. When such power is integrated into laws and regulations, it might 
be the reason why dominant groups find its power legitimate and natural. Although 
power is not always exercised in obviously offensive acts of dominant group members, 
it might be enacted the numerous taken-for-granted actions of everyday life (van Dijk, 
1993:250; 2001:355).  
When analysing the relation between discourse and power, it is firstly required to 
acknowledge that access to specific forms of discourse, such as politics, media or 
science, is a power resource in itself. In other words, groups who have the power to 
influence the most influential discourse by knowledge or opinions, will most likely 
have a higher chance of controlling the minds and actions of others. Members of 
powerful groups and institutions, like the prime minister and other elites have more 
or less exclusive access and control over the public discourse, since they have the 
power to implement and develop laws and policies. They are by definition more 
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powerful and one of the vital constituents of dominance, which is to say social power. 
Important to bear in mind is that all levels of context, text and talk can be controlled 
by powerful speakers and such power can be abused at the expense of other 
participants. Despite this, talk and text do not always and directly enact or embody 
the overall power relations between groups. Generally, it is the context that could 
interfere or transform such relationships (van Dijk, 1993; 2001:356-7).  
For a researcher, who is conducting a critical discourse analysis, it is essential 
important to understand the nature of social power and dominance. This 
understanding will facilitate the researcher’s formulation of ideas on how discourse 
contributes to the reproduction of dominance.  Moreover, it is pertinent to gain an 
insight into how powerful speakers or groups/institutions enact their power in 
discourse, as well as to what extent they are able to persuade or influence their 
audience. Which are the discursive structures and strategies in such a process?  
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4. Methodology 
The welfare chauvinistic discourse is, as we can see throughout this research, 
particularly focused on the tension between inclusion and exclusion in the welfare 
state. One of the most interesting paradoxes that characterises a welfare state is: “the 
combination of egalitarian views on the one hand and restrictive view pertaining to 
the deservingness of immigrants on the other hand” (de Koster et al., 2012:6).  The 
concept of welfare chauvinism as a political discourse extends across the whole 
political spectrum. It is linked to both the political institutions as well as practical 
policy instruments. In other words, the concept has significance in both political 
speeches and in the actual policy outcome. 
This chapter will firstly present the method used in the thesis, a documentary 
analysis. Moreover, the empirical material and the selection of documents are 
discussed. Since welfare chauvinism permeates the whole political spectrum there is a 
wide range of the textual material. I have chosen documents among political speeches, 
election manifesto of the SAP and Moderaterna. I analyse these documents using 
discourse analysis because this strategy provides the researcher with both theoretical 
and methodological tools. This chapter presents the importance and the benefits of 
conducting a discourse analysis, but also mentions its limits. A critical discourse 
analysis also offer analytical tools that will guide the researcher throughout the 
analysis and are presented in the end of this chapter.  
 
4.1. Documentary Analysis 
Document analysis is a procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents, which 
are a specific form of empirical data referred to as “unobtrusive measures” (Lee, 2000). 
Documents come in different forms, for instance, personal documents such as diaries 
and letters, or official documents, as in my case speeches and manifestos. When 
conducting a document analysis, it is required to examine and interpret the data in 
order to elicit meaning, gain understanding and develop empirical knowledge about 
a certain issue. Documents provide the researcher with data on a specific context at on 
the same time provide background information as well as historical insight (Bowen, 
2009).  
Furthermore, information and insights derived from documents, which are 
political speeches and manifestos in this research, will contribute with valuable 
additions to the knowledge base about changing discourses. The most important and 
relevant in this study, is that the documents will provide me with a great tool of 
tracking change and developments. To answer my research questions, I will study the 
documents of my considerations and compare with regard to how they address and 
identify the issues of welfare and refugees in the course of time. When there is a 
convergence of information or meanings emerging from different documents, readers 
of the study usually have greater confidence in the trustworthiness of the findings 
(Bowen, 2009) 
 
.  
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4.2. Analytic Strategy - Discourse Analysis 
To answer my research questions, I conduct a critical discourse analysis of the 
document, as it is suitable for doing research on societal issues and especially when 
looking into questions of power and how this creates meanings in our world as we see 
it (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000).  
“In order for there to be a movement (of power relations) from above to below there 
has to be a capillarity from below to above at the same time” (Foucault, 1980:201). 
Power is a central notion in most CDA, especially the social power of groups or 
institutions. Social power can be described as control, in other words groups have 
power if they can control the acts and minds of other groups. Powerful groups such as 
political parties can for instance have control over public discourse, as in this case the 
discourse regarding welfare and refugees. The ability of powerful groups lies in their 
power base, which means that they have access to social resources such as force, 
money, status, information and knowledge (van Dijk, 2001).  
In the case of this research, both Löfven and Batra have a solid power base with 
access to money, information and knowledge, and for that reason, they are accorded 
as ‘experts’ and they make statements with authority that clearly embody truth claims. 
By their statements, they might influence peoples’ minds, for example their knowledge 
and opinions and in some cases, it will indirectly control some of their actions. In other 
words, authorities who have the ability to control the most influential discourse also 
have more chances to control the minds and actions of others (van Dijk, 2011). Not 
everyone has however equal access to discourses, when an ‘ordinary’ person with a 
lower power base make statements about societal issues, their comments are more 
often framed as opinions rather than truths, for that reason it is interesting to analyse 
the distribution and transformation of discourses in a certain context. There can be 
power imbalances between different discourses, to be able to analyse the order of 
discourses within a certain context it is relevant to identify the relationship between 
discourses. By identifying this relationship, it can explicate why people draw on some 
discourses rather than others in specific situations, it is however appropriate to focus 
on a single order of discourse, such as welfare and refugees but it is still highly relevant 
not to forget the relationship between different discourses (van Dijk, 2001; Jørgensen 
& Phillips, 2002). 
When conducting a discourse analysis, it is important to pay attention to 
intertextuality and not only focus on the content of letters. It is rather significant to look 
at the way writers/speechmaker formulate their accounts linguistically. It is more 
relevant to study how things are written/expressed instead of what is said. 
Furthermore, when conducting a discourse analysis, it is important as a researcher to 
not treat each text as a discrete item, but rather interpret texts in the light of other 
relevant text the researcher have encountered. What creates meaning, and shape the 
sense in a discourse analysis are the words that are chosen to state something, and the 
way in which they are spoken. (Cameron & Pavovic, 2014).  
I have in detail studied a set of speeches by the Swedish politicians. Further, 
intertextual chains have been traced between 2015 and 2016, which means that the 
‘same’ announcement are seen in a range of different versions. As a discourse analyst, 
I am rather concerned with the effects of discourse and what discourse can do, rather 
than the individuals who use it and whose speech I am analysing. The effects of 
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discourse are in other words more interesting than the thoughts and feelings expressed 
by the individual speakers. I have worked through the text line by line, and step by 
step. Since I as a researcher, have a certain perspective on language whilst I am reading 
the text it allows me to produce a particular kind of reading of the text, a reading which 
foregrounds the constructive and performative properties of language (Willig, 
2013:341-3).  
 
4.2.1. Micro, Meso and Macro 
It is highly relevant to be aware of the different levels of discourse and how they 
are connected. To be able to understand the macro-level where issues such as power, 
dominance and inequality are tackled by for instance laws and regulations it is 
necessary to, firstly, understand the movement between micro-meso-levels and meso-
macro-levels. 
Micro-level can be designated as the overall theme that emerge from analysis of 
texts, in other words the use of language and verbal interaction, whilst meso-level is 
the context where the use of language and verbal interaction is happening i.e. under 
which circumstances the speech is held. As abovementioned, the macro level is large-
scale orders of several texts across several years, such as policies (Talib & Fitzgerald, 
2016). By scrutinizing the different levels and the movement between them, the 
analysis will be able to trace the evolution of the underpinning values through 
watchwords and metaphors related to them. The watchwords such as solidarity, 
togetherness and deservingness have been identified within previous studies as the 
most important watchwords within folkhemmet. Depending on context and discussion 
the words can get different meanings. Furthermore, the process of examining the 
different dimensions of the watchwords, will expose how such values are transported 
and propagated to the Swedish population through watchwords and metaphors, and 
their relation through three interconnected levels. As mentioned above, macro values 
are made desirable through support by the micro valuations within and though 
metaphorical relations. Significantly, watchwords and metaphors are used to bridge, 
connect, and smooth over contradictions but also provide an appearance of logical 
cohesion in the political speeches by Löfven and Batra. The movement between the 
micro- and the macro levels is however connected by the meso-level that constitutes 
the transitional link between the two levels. (Talib & Fitzgerald, 2016:356).  
 
4.3. Empirical Material 
The empirical material in this study consists of two different types: political 
speeches by the Swedish politicians, such as the Prime Minister Stefan Löfven and 
Anna Kinberg Batra, a party leader for the liberal party (Moderaterna) and the election 
manifestos of the both parties for the period 2014-2018. Most of the speeches chosen 
for closer analysis were held in a public context, and both Löfven and Batra aimed to 
reach out to the Swedish population as a whole. One of the speeches was held at a 
service house for seniors (Rågsveds servicehus) whilst one speech was held at a 
municipality conference (Örebro kommunkonferens). The various contexts show that 
both Löfven and Batra want to reach out to as many people as possible by operating 
in different fields. Relevant however is that the chosen speeches consist of more than 
what is analysed in this research. I have actively limited the analyse to the sections that 
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focus primarily on welfare and refugees. When it comes to election manifestos, the 
texts of manifestos’ chosen for the analysis in this study consist of more than just issues 
relating to refugees and asylum, thus, even in relation to them the focus will be put on 
the parts concerning refugees and welfare.   
 These two sources of material cover the time-period between years 2015-2016 for 
the speeches and years 2014-2018 for the manifestos. Combining these two sources of 
material together is relevant for my study as they help me to identify the discourses 
just before the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ had its peak in 2015 and, their changing 
patterns in relation to the issues of welfare and the inclusion of refugees/asylum 
seekers. Consequently, this body of texts constitute the primary material and the 
ground for the discourse analysis. To understand the outcome of the changing 
discourse regarding welfare and migration, I have also in detail studied the temporary 
laws and regulation regarding refugees that was implemented in 2015 and 2016 (Law 
2016:752 - limited possibilities of being granted a residence permit in Sweden & 
Amendment to the right to assistance under the Reception of Asylum Seekers act).  
 
4.3.1. Selection of documents 
My selection of documents will consequently include;  
 
• Summer Speech (Sommartal) 16th of august 2015, Stefan Löfven 
• Speech at the manifestation of asylum reception (Tal på mainifestation för 
asylmottagande) 6th of September 2015, Stefan Löfven 
• Address to the meeting (Stämmotal) 17th of October 2015, Anna Kinberg Batra 
• Christmas Speech (Jultal) 16th of December 2015, Anna Kinberg Batra 
• The battle of the Swedish Model (Striden om den Svenska Modellen) 29th of 
February 2016, Stefan Löfven 
• The Strength of the Swedish Model (Den Svenska Modellens styrka) 12th of March 
2016, Stefan Löfven 
• A plan for a Stronger Sweden (En plan för ett starkare Sverige) 21th of May 2016, 
Anna Kinberg Batra 
• Summer Speech (Sommartal) 6th of June 2016, Anna Kinberg Batra 
• We Build Sweden (Vi bygger Svergie) Election Manifesto, The Alliance 2014-2018. 
• Dear Future, Election Manifesto for a Better Sweden. For All. (Kära Framtid, 
valmanifest för ett bättre Sverige. För alla.) Election Manifesto, Social 
Democrats 2014-2018. 
• Limited possibilities of being granted a residence permit in Sweden, Law 
(2016:752).  
• A solidarity-based refugee and migration policy and a secure world, 15th of 
March 2016, Government Offices of Sweden.  
 
Throughout the study, the different speeches will be referred to using its Swedish 
name. There will however not be citations from all of the abovementioned speeches in 
the analysis, despite this, it is important to highlight that all speeches and documents 
have been analysed and studied in close relation to each other. The selected citations 
are however considered to be a reoccurring theme latent in all speeches.  
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4.4. Quality of qualitative research 
In order for the study to be valid it is important that the research is made 
transparent, so that the reader can follow the process and consider whether the 
assumptions made and the results in the study are consistent and acceptable 
(Jørgensen & Philips, 2002). To produce a transparent result, I am showing discourses 
with citations and explaining the identified discourses one by one. It is impossible as 
a researcher to produce completely transparent knowledge since it is always 
influenced by context (ibid). To the extent it is possible, I need to distance myself from 
my understandings in order to see the knowledge that is taken for granted. By looking 
at historical understandings, and move away from the centre, it is possible to see how 
knowledge has developed and taken another form today (Jørgensen & Philips 2002: 
189 pp.)  
Since I am investigating a sensitive topic, meanwhile it is related to a vulnerable 
and exposed group, and it is also politically sensitive in many aspects. It is highly 
important to be reflective and always consider ethical issues. To obtain high quality in 
my research I have been aware of subjectivity and biases on the issues. I have also been 
aware that this research is conducted in a context were some interests and opinions 
are dominant and interfering with others (May, 1997). Therefore, I have tried to stay 
objective as far as it goes but I have also been selective when choosing my material. 
When I selected my empirical material, I put the problem in the centre, the chosen 
material is representative for how the Government represented the situation around 
my chosen time period and how decisions are coming to be justified. I gather my data 
by visiting the SAP’s and Moderaterna’s websites, since I had already decided my time-
period I decided to include speeches which focus on welfare and refugees. I consider 
my empirical material to be reliable since it is official documents published on the 
parties’ websites.  
Researchers such as Tracy (2012), claim that a study should have a formal 
generalizability, in that the findings should be transferable in other contexts. Since this 
study is very specific and context-based and only refers to the changing political 
discourse in Sweden regarding inclusive welfare for refugees. Therefore, this specific 
study may not be transferable into other contexts. However, from this study we might 
be able to make predictions about how political parties change their stance regarding 
inclusive welfare for refugees’ when it endangers the welfare system.   
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5. Results and Analysis 
Below follow the results, consisting of discursive groupings that I have identified 
by interpreting citations from the election manifesto, speeches held by Löfven and 
Batra, and additional material using the concepts of solidarity, togetherness and 
deservingness. The separation of the discourses in different groupings is not 
completely distinct since some results are defined as consisting of more than one 
discourse.  
The Social Democrats and Moderaterna are separately analysed as representations 
of the micro level discourse in order to get a deeper understanding of how the 
discourse changes over time in each of the political camps, and how they relate to 
welfare chauvinism. The macro level combines the speeches of the both parties and 
groups them under the common discursive threads, such as solidarity, deservingness 
and Folkhemmet. 
The citations from the election manifestos, speeches and the additional material 
are my own English translations. The original phrases are in Swedish and can be found 
in the appendix.  
 
5.1. Micro-level  
Social Democratic Party 2014–2018 
 
Solidarity 
Anyone that needs protection shall have sanctuary in our country. Everyone should have 
the right to an individual and legally secure examination of their asylum claims. All Swedish 
municipalities should take joint responsibility for receiving refugees. Meanwhile, EU 
member states be persuaded to take a more joint and solidaristic responsibility 
(Socialdemokraterna – Valmanifest, 2014) 
 
The SAP election manifesto deals very little with the refugee issue, in comparison 
to other issues being discussed, though when it is dealt with it is done so within an 
inclusive discourse. The statement above constitutes the most important declaration 
regarding Sweden’s responsibilities regarding refugees. It is however important that 
everyone in need shall have the possibility to apply for asylum in Sweden. There is a 
major focus on welfare and that everyone independently on where they come from 
shall have the same opportunities in life. Moreover, it is stated that Sweden shall be 
the main player when it comes to the distribution of human rights. It is also argued 
that the EU needs to assume bigger responsibilities regarding peace and solidarity. It 
is further declared that the voice of Sweden shall be loud and clear when the dignity 
of humans is offended.  The SAP election manifesto was conducted before the so-called 
refugee crisis had its peak and that probably is the main reason why there is so little 
focus on refugees in relation to the welfare state. In 2015, especially during the summer 
one can identify a change in discourse regarding the Swedish welfare state and the 
stance regarding inclusiveness and open borders.  
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The reception system is strained to its full capacity and the employees are on their knees. We 
therefore want to introduce a period to reduce the number of asylum seekers arriving to 
Sweden. The law should be temporarily adjusted to the minimum level in the EU so that 
more people will choose to seek asylum in other countries (Löfven, 2015-11-24) 
 
At the press conference on the 24th of November 2015 the Prime Minister Stefan 
Löfven together with the Deputy Minister Åsa Romson announced a reintroduction of 
the internal border controls and identity checks in order to “create moratorium for the 
Swedish refugee reception” (Regeringskansliet, 2015b). This action was unprecedented 
since the borders between the Nordic countries discontinued much earlier than the 
Schengen agreement was introduced. There were surprisingly small reactions to this 
action and this was probably due to that it was framed as temporary. 
  In other words, the Swedish laws and regulation meant to temporary be adapted 
to the EU minimum requirements according to international law. The actual decision 
might however be understood as something much more drastic. The implementation 
of ID controls and a limited access to entering the country can also be taken as a sign 
in favour of the national agenda and a departure from the principles of solidarity and 
inclusiveness. On the one hand, this would not come as a surprise if we recall, the 
SAP’s previous record of supporting strict entry policies (Hinnfors et al., 2011). On the 
other hand, the politics of the SAP support solidarity and inclusiveness, one would 
therefore expect this party to advocate greater generosity regarding migration and 
especially when addressing the needs of refugees who are considered to be a 
vulnerable group. 
 
Nationalistic Discourse 
 
We have had these rules for a long time [humane refugee policy] and it has worked well, but 
when the refugee crisis increases this much, then something entirely different happens. We 
need to relate to reality (Government Offices of Sweden, 2015). 
 
Sweden has had the worst refugee crisis since World War II, and we have taken on more 
responsibility than any other country in the Western World. We are a small country that 
makes a huge effort and the Swedish people showing great solidarity at a difficult time. We 
cherish the international asylum law. […] Therefore, the government now proposes a 
number of measures to create a moratorium for the Swedish refugee reception 
(Regeringskansliet, 2015b).   
 
Sweden has for a long time had a generous solidarity based refugee policy, 
according to Löfven, this stance now needs to be transformed. The decision to 
introduce ID-checks and controls at internal borders stems from a discursive change 
from an inclusive discourse towards a nationalistic discourse. Löfven argues that other 
countries need to take their responsibility and according to the increased influx of 
refugees to Sweden, it is no longer possible to maintain an open and solidarity based 
policy. Sweden is known for being an inclusive society that defends multiculturalism 
and open up its doors for those who is seeking asylum and a new life. Sweden has 
been a so-called ‘exceptionalist’ model for other states to follow (Schierup & Ålund, 
2011). The decision taken by Löfven and his Government are divergent to what was 
previously known as the ‘exceptionalist’ model.  Löfven together with the government 
are talking about ‘the worst refugee crisis’, at the same time as the Government decide 
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to make it almost impossible to receive refugee status in Sweden. Löfven states that: 
“It is time for the EU to move from chaos towards control” (Löfven – Den svenska 
modellens styrka, 2016-03-12). Sweden is a small country that has shown a great sense 
of solidarity and made huge efforts at a difficult time. Whilst Sweden is doing 
something that showing solidarity on a high level, other EU countries need to resume 
their solidarity, it is necessary that other EU countries start to take their responsibilities 
according to Löfven and his government (Regeringskansilet, 2015b).  
 
There must be order in the Swedish refugee reception. It should be characterized by 
responsibility, decency and straight roads into work (Löfven – Sommartal, 2015-08-16) 
 
As Löfven states it is important that there is an order in the refugee reception. 
Sweden has taken large responsibility and the time has come to ensure a decent future 
reception. The welfare state and its provisions should be allocated to those in the 
highest need, and regardless of what status a person has, all citizens shall be entitled 
to the same level of welfare provisions. Sweden is represented as having great solidarity 
and one of the most important perspectives of solidarity is equal access to welfare, 
Löfven declares that “those granted asylum must both do their duty and work and get 
their right to welfare” (Löfven – Den svenska modellens styrka, 2016-03-12). The 
importance of having a well organised refugee reception goes hand in hand with the 
Swedish model according to Löfven. As a result of the TUT and the reintroduced ID-
controls there will be many people who will not be able to get asylum in Sweden. 
Löfven focuses significantly on that the EU needs to take their responsibility and 
implement a more solidarity based asylum reception, since Sweden is not able to 
receive more refugees. This can be understood as showing solidarity for those who 
will not be able to seek asylum in Sweden, since the Swedish model cannot manage 
more.  
 
We [see Social Democrats] reject the Swedish Democrat’s extreme drive against immigrants. 
We [see Social Democrats] stand for a regulated immigration and a reception that makes 
welfare work for everyone. […] Here we are equal. That is a natural part of the future of the 
Swedish model (Löfven – Den svenska modellens styrka, 2016-03-12). 
 
 
It becomes evident that a solidarity based refugee policy is not equal to generous 
immigration and open borders when Löfven describes what the Swedish model stands 
for: 
 
What we create should be a welfare that meets every human need for freedom of choice and 
individual adaptation (Löfven – Striden om den svenska modellen, 2016-02-29) 
 
 
[…] Humane refugee policy – regulated immigration – which in a sustainable, long-term 
sustainable way, can make sure that we can do the best both for the society and for people 
fleeing [meaning]: opportunity to provide jobs, housing and education (Government Offices 
of Sweden, 2015).   
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A solidarity based refugee policy is represented as regulated immigration, not as 
open borders and inclusiveness. Solidarity is understood as regulated and sustainable, 
it is important that we can offer a life with dignity, in other words refugees shall have 
access to jobs, housing and education – the cornerstones for the welfare state. To be 
able to maintain high levels of solidarity and to be able to provide these services to the 
people who arrive in Sweden it is necessary to regulate the influx of people. Otherwise, 
Sweden will not be able to reach the goal of solidarity.  
Thus, it can be argued that the goal with the changing discourse – the move from 
an open and inclusive refugee policy towards a more regulated policy is to ensure that 
the Swedish welfare state can provide welfare services to the whole population. 
During 2015 and in the aftermath of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ the Swedish welfare 
state could not ensure that all newly arrived obtained welfare services. Löfven declare 
that this is a national duty that Sweden as a country shall solve the problems together, 
and every municipality need to take its responsibility. The 6th of September 2015 at Tal 
på manifestation för asylmottagande Löfven stated: “Solidarity is our greatest pride”, 
during this time the biggest challenge was to share the burden within Sweden. The 
more time that passed and the greater influx of refugees Sweden has responded to, 
there has also been a transfer of responsibility. The 12th of March 2016 Löfven stated 
that:  
 
We need to ensure control of our external borders, implement the redistribution of refugees 
within the Union […] where you apply for asylum within the EU, not a single country […] 
we need to take a join responsibility for the asylum reception (Löfven - Den svenska 
modellens styrka, 2016-03-12). 
 
According to the statement above, Sweden is represented as doing very much and 
taking great responsibility whilst the other EU countries are doing very little.  It is then 
necessary that Sweden is taking control over its borders. This move can be understood 
as a proof that Sweden takes responsibility in contrast to the other European member 
states. The Government further states that Sweden act in accordance to the principle 
of solidarity and that Sweden takes responsibility for “the other” – the refugees. 
Löfven asserts that the Government conducts a refugee policy based on solidarity. 
Solidarity in other words mean that the Other shall have access to welfare provisions, 
this is not possible if Sweden continues to have open borders: 
 
We chose a regulated immigration policy and an individualized establishment so those who 
are granted asylum can do their duty and demand their rights […] to form the basis of free 
and equal people in a solidaristic society (Löfven – Den svenska modellens styrka, 2016-03-
12) 
 
Moderaterna 2014–2018 
Solidarity 
In contrast to the SAP, the election manifesto by Moderaterna employ a 
fundamentally inclusive discourse, with arguments that Sweden needs to take its 
responsibilities for refugees and the importance of being an open country. The overall 
theme is that Sweden has the chance to become a humanitarian great power, and it is 
 27 
 
also argued that Sweden has done this before during the Balkan war, and that Sweden 
can do it again.  
 
We live in an anxious time, where people are forced to flee for their lives from war and 
oppression. Not since World War II, so many people have been in trouble. [...] Many people 
choose to search sanctuary in our country. The Alliance government, along with the Green 
Party, has chosen a different path from that chosen by many other European countries. 
Instead of ending with the outside world, we have said that Sweden should pursue a 
humane asylum policy and be a safe place for those who suffer from persecution and 
oppression. We have shown that it is possible to put humanity first and open the door for 
those who need protection (Moderaterna – Valmanifest, 2014) 
 
The manifesto is structured along the arguments such as that Sweden shall 
continue being a country who takes its responsibilities because we have the ability to 
do it. Firstly, Moderaterna consider the Swedish refugee reception to be a moral 
obligation but also an investment for the future. Secondly, similar to SAP, Moderaterna 
argue that Sweden is one of the countries taking the biggest responsibility and it is 
now time for other EU-countries to begin to take their responsibilities. It is further 
declared that 
 
The Alliance believes that Sweden will become better if more people are moving here, to 
build a better future and work (Moderates - Valmanifest, 2014). 
 
In comparison with the SAP’s election manifesto, Moderaterna has a fundamentally 
different view of the refugee reception. Moderaterna argues that immigration will make 
Sweden stronger and they further pay attention to establishment for newly arrived. 
There is also a major focus on increased movement and openness towards the rest of 
the world. In general, much emphasis is directed towards integrations processes and 
how these processes shall become more effective. Important though is that there 
remain big challenges and new reforms need to be implemented. Currently the road 
for newly arrived persons to become a part of the society is too long and complicated. 
The election manifest was written before the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ and there is a big 
chance that there would be considerably different focus if it was formulated today. By 
following the speeches of Anna Kinberg Batra between 2015 and 2016 it becomes 
evident that there is now more attention to how Sweden needs to deal with the ‘refugee 
crisis’ and that the EU need to spread the burden, but also the importance for Sweden 
to have a credible reliance. Batra further declares: 
 
It is obvious that the government is unable to take control of the situation [...] reorganization 
of migration policy. [...] order and reason in the reception. [...] A basic prerequisite for 
regulated immigration is to have control over who is coming here. A temporary residence 
permit is required (Anna Kinberg Batra - Stämmotal, 2015-10-17). 
 
Nationalistic Discourse 
In 2015, it is possible to notice the first changes in the rhetoric when Batra is talking 
about the refugee situation. Batra starts to blame Löfven and his Government and there 
is a major focus on controlled and regulated immigration. She also claimed that it is 
necessary to implement temporary residence permits. This in combination with the 
statements regarding that other EU-countries need to take their responsibility and 
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share the burden with Sweden, appears to be as a visible shift in the discourse. There 
has been a quick transformation in the rhetoric: as in 2014 and the beginning of 2015 
Batra puts a major attention on the benefits of people moving here, and in the 
beginning of the autumn 2015 she talks about the importance of temporary residence 
permits. This presents as a move from an inclusive and open discourse towards a more 
nationalistic discourse with focus on order and control in the Swedish immigration 
reception.  
  
[...] The person who has been rejected asylum shall of course not, as it is today, be entitled to 
compensation (Anna Kinberg Batra – Stämmotal, 2015-10-17). 
 
The tone and the language that Batra is using is becoming tougher, and she makes 
clear that if an asylum seeker is not allowed to stay legally in Sweden, she/he will 
neither have a chance to take part of the Swedish welfare benefits. She further states 
that: “we cannot take our prosperity for granted”. The reason why we have such a 
wealthy country today is because of individual humans who have endeavoured for a 
better life, that struggle is the cornerstone for the Swedish social contract. She states 
that it is necessary with a change, that it is time to develop the Swedish model instead 
of striving backwards. Sweden has for a long time had generous policies that are in 
need of transformation. Sweden has a history of being well-organized and the citizens’ 
have high levels of trust for each other and the institutions. For this trust to continue, 
it is necessary that the society stands on a solid ground. That goes hand in hand with 
an organized asylum reception, and she states that it is possible for Sweden to become 
even stronger. 
 
People who had a picture of our country as one of the world’s best societies, encountered a 
Swedish society where important parts actually did not work as they usually do (Anna 
Kinberg Batra – En plan för ett starkare Sverige, 2016-05-15).   
 
By the summer 2016, Batra declared that the Swedish asylum reception had failed. 
During a very short period there was a large amount of people who entered Sweden 
with high expectations for a better life. Instead of offering a safe place with housing 
and job opportunities, many people faced misery and extensive wait for clearance of 
what is happening next – if they are allowed to stay in Sweden or if they need to go 
back. The ‘refugee crisis’ revealed the weaknesses of the Swedish society, and it 
showed that Sweden was not enough prepared for the short-term crisis or the long-
term challenges. Batra argues that: “this is a threat towards the Swedish society” (Anna 
Kinberg Batra – Sommartal, 2016-06-06). Repeatedly, Batra declares that the ‘refugee 
crisis’ will aggravate the already existing exclusion of people in the Swedish society. 
This evolution need to stop, if Sweden shall continue to be the best country in the 
world it is necessary to work together and prioritize issues such as order and clear 
course of action. 
 
[…] It is naïve to believe that the refugee crisis is over. It will affect us for a long period 
ahead. The stream of refugees to Sweden has decreased […] We need a temporary break 
from refugees and continuing border checks until we get order in our refugee reception, so 
that we can help those in need (Anna Kinberg Batra – En plan för ett starkare Sverige, 2016-
05-15).  
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In Anna Kinberg Batras arguments it becomes evident that it is now time to focus 
on Sweden as the high influx of people to Sweden will affect the country and the 
Swedish system for a long time. She further declared the importance of new reforms 
and that Löfven ignored the exclusion of people that are becoming common in 
Sweden. “When the society is not capable of taking care of people coming in, or 
granting a safety net for everyone, new societies occur where we live in parallel with 
each other and not together” (Anna Kinberg Batra – Jultal, 2015-12-16). In order to 
maintain the Swedish society and the feeling of togetherness it is according to the 
leader of Moderaterna necessary to ensure that all people have a decent life. According 
to the abovementioned statements, it is necessary that Sweden has control over its 
borders and the refugee reception. It is more dignified if a society is capable to ensure 
a good living standard for those people who already are here, instead of letting more 
people in and not be able to offer a valuable life.  
 
5.2. Macro-level 
 The speeches held by Löfven and Batra and the election manifestos by the SAP 
and Moderaterna belong to the micro level of the discourse where we can observe verbal 
interaction and trace the evolution of underpinning values. The policies following 
these interactions are then formulated on the macro-level. It is thus important to 
establish a link between the rhetoric within the micro- and macro-levels and the 
respective changes taking place. On the micro-level, it is possible to argue that both 
parties ignore welfare chauvinistic concepts and actively attack the ideas of the SD by 
stating that the SAP and Moderaterna will never accept the inhumane refugee policies 
that the SD proposes. On the macro-level, however it is possible to detect that both 
parties change their stance on these issues. Even if not being expressed orally the 
implementation of the temporary laws and regulations, in relation to inclusiveness of 
refugees into the Swedish society the SAP and Moderaterna tend to accommodate the 
rhetoric of the SD, and the claims of welfare chauvinism. 
 
5.2.1. Solidarity  
The analysis undertaken here focuses on identifying the degree of welfare 
chauvinism embedded in the policy framework and on identifying different elements 
characteristic to welfare chauvinism in the political speeches. Since ideas pertaining to 
welfare chauvinism gained significance in the whole political spectrum of the Swedish 
society, from public rhetoric to actual policy, it is important to analyse how these ideas 
are constructed. 
Fundamentally, the welfare chauvinistic discourse is predominantly focused on 
the tension between the inclusion and exclusion in the welfare state and who deserves 
to take part of welfare provisions (de Koster et al., 2012).  
In order for a welfare state to function in the first place, the welfare system 
demands some agreement on solidarity among the members of the community, in 
other words, a ‘social contract’ (Marshall, 1963). This is based on criteria regarding 
who is entitled to what. At the same time, there is a strong emphasis on citizens’ duties 
and obligations. As discussed earlier in this research, welfare chauvinism can take 
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several expressions, for example the ‘unwillingness to grant the same entitlements to 
all people in the society’. In other words, welfare chauvinism becomes the question of 
whether refugees should have the same social rights as native citizens or not 
(Jørgensen & Thomsen, 2016). According to Andersen and Bjorklund (1990) populist 
parties developed a political discourse where immigration issues were approached 
from the economic perspective of the redistribution of welfare provisions between ‘us’ 
and the ‘others’. Important however is that welfare chauvinism is not simply based on 
cultural or ethnic racism, it rather touches upon a socioeconomic argument about the 
future protection of welfare provisions.  
An essential part of the agreement about redistributive welfare arrangements is 
based on mutual trust. Contributors to the Swedish society want to be sure that no-
one can take advantage of the benefits without contributing to the system themselves. 
As Eger (2009) point out, the Swedish welfare state was designed on the basis of a 
homogeneous population, and the Swedish economy has successfully adapted to 
international challenges by taking advantage of institutions built upon a powerful 
sense of civic solidarity. The increased influx of refugees recently, has challenged the 
status quo, and the Swedish population nowadays consists of diversified inhabitants. 
One of the reasons why it challenges the status quo is that the immigration to Sweden 
has got a different form, from being predominantly labour migrations contributing to 
the society through work towards an immigration consisting of almost only refugees 
who in most cases need special treatment.  
The radical right in Sweden describes these challenges as “a situation that pits the 
hardworking natives, the ‘silent (ethnic) majority’ […] against the allegedly 
undeserving migrant ‘other’” (Norocel, 2016:373). It is however clear that there is an 
ongoing debate between an exclusive stance aiming to restrict immigration versus a 
more inclusive humanitarian position. During the refugee ‘crisis’ it is evident that 
these two standpoints have come closer to each other, even though they express 
themselves differently.  
  Recently the Swedish mainstream parties have been taking a more restrictive 
stance on immigration. This is clearly reflected in the adoption of the temporary laws 
that were implemented in 2015 and 2016. Despite this departure from the previously 
generous position from both the SAP and Moderaterna, both Löfven and Batra are 
talking about the importance of redistribution, togetherness and a stronger Sweden. 
But what is recurring throughout all the speeches, is that both Löfven and Batra 
repeatedly mention that we all should be very proud of Sweden for what we have 
accomplished together. Furthermore, they make clear that they will not cooperate with 
the SD and they will not accept their inhumane migration policy5. 
However, it is interesting that during the same time as the leaders were distancing 
themselves and their parties from the SD, they were implementing temporary laws 
that can be understood as an attempt to accommodate SD’s anti-immigrant rhetoric, 
very restrictive and harsh. Two of the most influential6 mainstreams parties in Sweden 
where during the period7 taking a tough policy position on immigration. This tough 
                                                 
5 2017 Moderaterna has a different stance regarding cooperation with the SD and do cooperate with them within 
certain areas.  
6 Most influential parties during my chosen time period, today (2017) this looks different and Moderaterna has a 
decrease in support.  
7 2015-2016, but this is also current in May 2017.  
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policy stance might have helped the anti-immigrant parties, such as the SD to 
overcome the barrier of non-respectability, since voters might take this as a signal that 
tough immigration policies are relevant and necessary.  
Following Freeman (2009), we could argue that the tendency to retreat from the 
inclusive treatment of others becomes politically legitimate in the times when Sweden 
becomes more and more heterogenic and displays lower levels of support for 
redistributive welfare programs and lower levels of social trust. This is not the first 
time when welfare and asylum has been high on the political agenda. During the 
beginning of the 1990s Sweden received over 70.000 asylum seekers from the former 
Yugoslavia. There were big concerns among the Swedish citizens whether the welfare 
system could sustain more asylum-seekers and immigrants in search for a job. There 
was at the same time a big distrust towards the newcomers, the so-called ‘other’ were 
understood as people without good intentions and only attracted by the Swedish 
welfare system (Eastmond, 2011). When members of a society can identify with other 
members of the welfare community it is easier to grasp their behaviour and it is also 
easier to trust them. Heterogeneity on the other hand challenge trust relations and the 
consensus of the “social-contract” (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004). As Coenders and 
Scheepers (2008) argue high influx of people might cause a decrease of trust and 
solidarity in the Swedish welfare state and a result of this can be lower support for the 
welfare state in general.  
 In this light, the implementation of the stricter laws and regulations regarding 
refugees and asylum-seekers might have been undertaken in order to maintain the 
feeling of ‘us’ and the ‘other’ since through speeches and other political statements 
refugees had since 2015 were framed as a challenge to the Swedish universal welfare 
state. Consequently, similar to the periods of 1990s, refugees since 2015 become the 
‘unwanted other’ that affect the possibilities of many Swedish citizens since it entails 
cut-backs in public spending and rising unemployment (Eastmond, 2011).  
 
5.2.2. Deservingness 
In general, deservingness is understood as the matter of reciprocity, in other words 
recipients of welfare benefits are judged by what they have contributed with, and what 
are they to contribute with to the society in the future. Discussions regarding the 
welfare state support have traditionally been connected with ideas about a kind of 
‘laziness’ (van Oorschot, 2009). During the beginning of the twentieth century there 
were concerns that too much social provisions would make people less hard-working, 
less responsible and less ambitious. Although this attitude has changed during the last 
decades, the connection between support for redistribution and public opinions about 
’deservingness’ is still highly relevant. This is especially apparent when studying the 
attitudes that explicitly wants to deny immigrants access to welfare provisions (van 
Oorschot, 2000). According to van Oorschot there are several criteria that are necessary 
to fulfil to ‘deserve’ welfare provision. One criterion is whether or not a person can 
take control over their neediness, persons who deserve welfare are those who lack such 
control, such as old and sick (ibid). A welfare chauvinistic perception of this criterion 
would claim that if a migrant that is able to work enters a welfare state and remains 
unemployed, s/he does not lack control over her/his neediness and because of that, 
should not be able to enjoy welfare benefits. Another principle defines a social area of 
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accountability, in other words, those ‘deserving’ are incapable poor people who belong 
to ‘us’. The ‘unwanted other’ who are distrusted and perceived as ‘threat’ to the 
welfare system are thus not seen as ‘deserving’ persons (Eastmond, 2009). It is thus 
evident that the ‘deservingness’ criteria designated by van Oorschot (2000) can easily 
be interpreted as welfare chauvinistic claims.   
When Sweden had experienced peak in asylum seekers in 1989 there was similar 
type of debates regarding deserving ‘others’ as we can observe in 2015-2016. Now as 
then, concerns were raised regarding increased influx of refugees and the potential 
threat to the welfare benefits of the Swedish citizens. The government stated that the 
welfare system could no longer sustain more asylum seekers and unemployment 
among immigrants was frequently debated (Eastmond, 2011).  
Similar to those times, Batra for instance, stated in the Stämmotal in 2015 that: 
“those who do not strive and do their best based on their own ability, take the right to 
demand that others will do it for them”. She further argues that it clashes with the 
Swedish values, and the same time as the Swedish citizens have opportunities in life 
is it likewise important that the citizens fulfil their responsibilities towards the society.  
Löfven on the other hand talks about the importance to develop the ‘Swedish 
model’ and create a welfare model where all inhabitants are included (Löfven – Den 
svenska modellens styrka, 2016-05-16). Löfven further states that the goal is a fair 
distribution among all and growing prosperity for all. Instead of making a difference 
between ‘us’ and the ‘other’ Löfven and Batra attempt to include everyone in the 
society, independently of who they are and where they come from. The most 
important is that everyone contributes to the society, based on their own capability. 
Done that, the person will then be included and welcomed to enjoy welfare benefits in 
Sweden. The main focus from both the SAP and Moderaterna is that no one should 
make profit from the welfare system. 
 
5.2.3. Reclaiming Folkhemmet 
Migrants in Sweden enjoy the same formal rights as the native population, this is 
what characterised Swedish universal welfare regime since its inception (Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Borevi, 2012; Nilsson & Nyström, 2016). Furthermore, welfare policy 
plays an important role for the opportunity of migrants to participate in the society. 
As discussed earlier, equality and solidarity have since the formation been the 
dominant themes in the Swedish welfare state. In order to create a strong society. This 
can be understood as a security through an extensive universalistic welfare model 
serving all members of the society, a thought grown out of a long social-democratic 
hegemony (Eastmond, 2011). The ongoing political debates about the future of the 
Swedish universal welfare state reflect similar developments across the Western 
Europe. In the two last parliamentary elections8 in Sweden the need for the new policy 
responses to migration has been prominent subjects, particularly on the part of the SD. 
Relevant to mention is that both the SAP and Moderaterna resisted the SD and their 
welfare chauvinist appeals during the two last parliamentary elections (Norocel, 2016). 
However, approximately a year after the parliamentary election 2014, the Government 
implemented new temporary laws with welfare chauvinistic influences. This shift is 
                                                 
8 2010 and 2014 
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potentially a forerunner for the transformation of a previously inclusive democratic 
society into a more selective society. By analysing the political speeches chosen for this 
study one can see a clear tendency to more selective attitude towards the welfare state. 
A subtle meaning that surfaces from the SAP is that Sweden’s need to change its 
policies regarding migration so that Swedes can continue having rights and good 
opportunities in life and at the same time keep the welfare state strong.  
As Schierup and Ålund (1991) maintain the Swedish multiculturalism has for a 
long time been seen as a solidarity project with an underlying aim to integrate the 
“other” to Swedish normality (Dahlstedt and Neergaard, 2016). As the analysis of the 
speeches illustrates the Swedish society tends to become more exclusive society, where 
obligations for the citizens towards the Swedish state are underlined much harder than 
their rights. It could be argued that there is an underlying impression that it is of highly 
importance to maintain the generous welfare provision for the whole Swedish 
population. 
According to the speeches analysed and the temporary laws implemented, 
solidarity seems to gain a new meaning, far from being generous and inclusive. The 
analysis shows that both the SAP and Moderaterna have toyed with rhetoric similar to 
that of the SD. In one sense, both parties speak about folkhemmet in nostalgic term. This 
means that especially the SAP9 but also Moderaterna believe that there are limits to the 
ability of the folkhemmet to make room for migrants, particularly when it comes to 
solidarity with others. Both Löfven and Batra argue that it is time to reclaim the 
‘Swedish model’ and folkhemmet, and it is time to develop the welfare state, and not 
dismantle it.  Andersson (2009) for instance, has described folkhemmet as ‘grey’, since 
its draws on complex legacies of both discipline and emancipation. Issues such as fear 
of the ‘other’ and sterilization policies are issues that have fundamentally tainted the 
discussion of the past and future of the Swedish welfare state. 
 Nowadays it could be argued that some of the fundamental parts of folkhemmet 
are becoming visible again. Folkhemmet has for a long time been seen as the key that 
holds the Swedish notion together and it has deeply been inscribed in the Swedish 
political culture. It has been described as a unique kind of ‘social contract’ which draws 
on notions of historical definitions of ‘Swedishness’ that is closely associated with 
folkhemmet (Andersson, 2009).  
Löfven and Batra speak about Sweden as a country to be proud of. Swedes 
according to them shall take pride in what they have accomplished in the sense of 
solidarity and welfare. They further declare that Sweden and its population will 
symbolise togetherness. These kinds of statements are recurring in all of their speeches, 
and it also shines through the election manifestos. Löfven and Batra put a lot of 
emphasis on togetherness, on the fact that Swedes need to help each other, to reach the 
highest level of solidarity and welfare. However, as the ‘refugee crisis’ escalates a clear 
change in attributing the responsibility for Sweden’s future is taking place. In the 
beginning of 2015 a major focus on spreading the burden within the Swedish 
municipalities. Just a few months later the main responsibilities for the refugees had 
been shifted towards the EU. The Government decided to adjust the Swedish asylum 
regulation in accordance to the EU minimum requirements with a hope that refugees 
should apply for asylum in other countries. Batra frequently blamed Löfven and his 
                                                 
9 Based on the speeches used for this research 
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government for the ‘refugee crisis’ that Sweden faced but she also readily passed the 
responsibilities for managing the crisis towards the EU. When the government 
implemented the border controls and the temporary laws on asylum, it has been 
treated as a sign of Sweden’s attempt to move from chaos to control regarding inflows of 
refugees. It is also evident that both Löfven and Batra chose to impose responsibilities 
on others rather than on themselves. The rhetorical similarities between the party 
leaders concerns the ways that the EU is supposed to take their responsibilities, with 
both leaders arguing that the crisis should be handled through the intergovernmental 
co-operation to solve the issues that single nations states cannot solve. 
It has been debated whether increased heterogeneity change the attitudes to the 
welfare state. Scholars such as Hjerm and Schnabel (2012) argue that heterogeneity is 
seen as a threat to the existence of the welfare state since it challenges the redistributive 
instruments.  This is reflected in the statements by Löfven and Batra as well, even if it 
is done covertly in the speeches. Both party leaders argue that Sweden is facing 
challenges regarding distribution of welfare provision due to the high numbers of 
newcomers. To get along with the distributive issues and make sure that all people 
within Sweden have access to welfare it is better to close the borders and limit the right 
to assistance when the refugees are denied asylum. It is rather more important to take 
care of those who are already living in Sweden. Even if Sweden has not implemented 
policies with assimilative traits so far, it is possible to trace strong similarities with the 
fundamental ideas of folkhemmet of the 1920s. For instance, if the welfare state shall 
survive it might be necessary to strengthen the connection between rights and 
obligations of its citizens but also tougher requirements for acquiring Swedish 
citizenship (Norocel, 2016). The implementation of the temporary laws and regulations 
can be understood as an attempt to strengthen and maintain folkhemmet and its cultural 
specificity by creating a gap between ‘us’ and the refugee ‘other’.  
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6. Discussion and Conclusion  
The aim of this thesis was to conduct a critical analysis on the inclusion and 
exclusion of refugees in the Swedish welfare state. By analysing speeches held by the 
most influential political parties during 2015 and 2016 it become evident that the party 
leaders and the Government change their stances in times of crisis. 
We have long referred to Sweden as a universal welfare state where welfare 
provisions shall apply to everyone within the state, thus including immigrants legally 
residing within its territory. Yet the most drastic decision taken by the Swedish 
government was to establish identity checks along the borders and consequently reject 
those who could not present valid identity documents at the border check points. 
Before 2016, the majority of all asylum seekers in Sweden, who applied for a residence 
permit and were granted one, received permanent residency (Swedish migration 
agency, 2016).  
Since 20th of July 2016, it is almost impossible to receive a permanent residence 
permit (PUT), with the exception of uncompanioned minors as well as families with 
minor children, who applied for asylum before the 24th of November 2015. Until 2019, 
persons who apply for and are granted asylum in Sweden will merely receive 
temporary residence permits (TUT) for the length of 13 months and three years 
depending on the status granted to them. Since family reunification is only granted to 
persons with refugee status and it requires special circumstances according to the new 
law, only a limited amount of persons will be granted this right. (Regeringskansliet, 
2015; 2015a; 2015b; Nilsson & Nyström, 2016; Swedish migration agency, 2016).  
It could be argued that granting permanent residence permit and a generous law 
regarding family reunification, which signified Sweden’s previous stand with regard 
to asylum, also stimulated more immigration. At the same time this kind of generous 
law went hand in hand with the Swedish sense of solidarity and belief that all persons 
living in Sweden were in the same boat. The implementation of more restrictive laws 
and regulations regarding asylum can thus be regarded as a starting point for drawing 
a line between “us” and “the others”. Furthermore, it can be seen as an indication that 
Swedes have become less willing to include and welcome people in to the welfare 
system. These more restrictive implemented measures might also be seen as a tool to 
‘intimidate’ people and reduce the number of arriving asylum seekers in Sweden. 
Arguably, it may signify a move from a universal welfare system towards a more 
selective system 
This critical analysis of this paper demonstrates that there is a discursive struggle 
between the inclusive universal welfare state and nationalistic, selective welfare state 
values. The struggle is mainly articulated through the watchwords identified by 
folkhemmet. This struggle indicates a crisis connected to the identity of the SAP and 
Moderaterna. Both parties are keen to claim solidarity towards the Swedish citizens 
understood as an open and a universal welfare state including both Swedes and 
newcomers. As the numbers of asylum seekers in Sweden increased, however, the 
meaning of solidarity expressed by the SAP and Moderaterna swiftly changed 
profoundly  
With this, the attitude towards taking responsibility for asylum seekers and their 
inclusion into the welfare state at a national level similarly changed. In 2015, political 
debates concerning migration focused on municipalities taking equal charge for the 
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newly arrived. When the ‘refugee crisis’ peaked, however, Swedish politicians 
highlighted the common responsibilities of EU member states for asylum seekers at 
the regional level. The Swedish Government now instead expressed expectation of 
other EU member states to execute their responsibilities pertaining to asylum seekers, 
as Sweden, according to Löfven and Batra, had carried out its and had reached its 
capacities in taking charge of asylum seekers. Responsibility here referred to equal 
‘burden-sharing’ amongst EU member states.  
Similarly, solidarity does no longer entails generous immigration policies and 
multiculturalism. Instead, it is linked to the crumbling capacity of the welfare state and 
its limits. The Government and Moderaterna tend to address the growing numbers of 
asylum seekers as a threat to the welfare state. Solidarity acquired a different meaning 
when the existence of the welfare state is endangered. Throughout the analysis, it 
becomes apparent how the nationalistic discourse has acquired a hegemonic position 
regarding the representation of Sweden and the inclusion of asylum seekers. There is, 
however, an ongoing struggle concerning the watchwords, or in other words the 
signifiers of folkhemmet.  
It becomes clear that multiculturalism might not be compatible with the ideals of 
folkhemmet. The core values of the Swedish society are built upon the notion that ‘we 
are all in the same boat’, since Swedes for a long time perceived themselves as a 
homogeneous and equal population for a long time and therefore all inhabitants 
should have same access to welfare services. When the population became more 
diverse and Sweden identified itself as a multicultural society it becomes evident that 
it is important to secure the welfare state from ‘needy’ persons. Due to increased 
immigration, core values such as togetherness are threatened, Swedes can no longer 
perceive themselves as equal. Nowadays a multitude of people are dependent on 
welfare services and they are not and have never been contributing to the welfare state. 
In the past, most of the people who were dependent on welfare services were the 
elderly and the poor and not persons with the ability to work, such as the majority of 
asylum seekers. 
 There is a common idea among scholars of politics and policy that the universal 
welfare regime has a stronger sense of solidarity and a higher level of tolerance 
towards marginalised groups among majority population, compared to the liberal and 
conservative regime (de Koster et al., 2012).  This idea is probably still hold its value, 
however, rapidly growing numbers of refugees during a very short period of time, 
seem to provoke xenophobic fear among the population that the welfare system could 
not sustain more asylum seekers and immigrants. The question is whether this fear is 
reflected in the speeches by Löfven and Batra and if that is one of the reasons why they 
accommodate welfare chauvinistic concepts and rhetoric by the SD?  
The language in their speeches is adjusted in order to justify actions taken by the 
present Swedish Government since 2015. The language in the speeches is further used 
in a such way so as to benefit the goal of the welfare state. For instance, it was stated 
that everyone has to have access to welfare provisions rather than having open and 
inclusive immigration policies. Inclusiveness has acquired a new meaning. By limiting 
the inflow of refugees Sweden claims to have a good establishment for those already 
living in Sweden.  
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The implementation of the more restrictive laws and policies were supposed to be 
a short-lived ‘moratorium’ and the basic idea was to return to more generous policies 
when the situation had ‘calmed’ down. However, in practice one can certainly argue 
that this is more than just a ‘moratorium’ and that there is a risk that the ‘moratorium’ 
will become a permanent stance of the Swedish government regarding the welfare 
inclusion of refugees and asylum seekers. According to Hinnfors et al. (2011) it should 
not have come as a surprise that the SAP chose to implement stricter policies regarding 
refugees, as they are the only mainstream party that has a consistent record of 
supporting this kind of policies. Moderaterna on the other hand usually criticise the 
SAP for implementing stricter entry policies and temporary resident permits. 
Moderaterna, together with the other liberal parties, have historically favoured 
permanent residence permits. Thus, one cannot claim that the SAP for adapting 
welfare chauvinistic concepts was due to the pressure of the SD, since they historically 
have had strict immigration policies.  
In fact, both the SAP and Moderaterna reject the SD in analysed speeches. Therefore, 
the parties have chosen to ignore SD’s rhetoric when speaking to the public. It is rather 
in the implemented laws and border controls where it is possible to see that they have 
adapted to the welfare chauvinistic concepts first pronounced by the SD.  
It is easy to move the problem towards the EU or to another political party. Neither 
Löfven nor Batra can stand confident and acknowledge their defects, instead they 
blame each other by pointing out the other persons/party’s shortcomings.  
What is most important, as this thesis shows, is that it is not only the laws and 
regulations on asylum matters that have undergone transformations. When analysing 
the speeches by Swedish parliamentarians from the summer of 2015 and until the 
summer of 2016, one can identify several major changes in how political speeches 
emphasise and define Sweden’s responsibilities as a receiving state. The most 
remarkable shift in the discourse is the one from the summer 2015 to the fall of 2015 
and onwards, namely the speeches held by Stefan Löfven and Anna Kinberg Batra, ‘on 
the need to open their hearts and invite people in to our society’, to shifting 
responsibility to other EU member states for reception and protection of refugees. In 
the course of a few months, the emphasis and the focus of the political discourse on 
asylum seekers in Sweden has been transformed from the inclusive welfare to a more 
strained welfare that demands regulated migration.   
During the time this study was conducted, a lot of changes took place in Sweden’s 
political sphere. Moderaterna for instance, having for a long time rejected SD and their 
politics towards refugees, have now decided to deliberate with SD on individual issues 
(Svt Nyheter -Därför har Moderaterna ändrat sig om SD, 2017-01-24).    
In the beginning of May 2017, the Government further chose to withdraw identity 
checks along Swedish borders and instead intensify the border controls. The withdraw 
of identity checks and Moderaterna’s new stance regarding SD shows that this is a 
highly dynamic area where changes are taking place very quickly and unannounced.  
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6.1. Further Research  
This study looked into the changing political discourse in Sweden regarding 
inclusive welfare for refugees, and how these changes has taken place between 2015 
and 2016. The speeches analysed were held during a very short period of time and the 
discourses articulated might not have reflect the whole complexity of the issues. In 
order to reflect the complexity of the issues more accurate, it would be recommended 
for future research to study the change of discourse in Sweden’s political sphere 
before, in between as well as after parliamentary elections. In fact, the closer 
parliamentary elections are the more party leaders tend to change their discourse in 
order to gain votes and react according to changing political situation. 
Finally, it is important to examine a broader spectrum of political debates on 
welfare and refugee reception by including other Swedish elected parties in the 
Government and the opposition.  
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8. Appendix  
Figure 1 – Total amount of asylum seekers in Sweden 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Swedish Migration Agency, 2016) 
 
8.1. Swedish Citations - Translations 
Socialdemokraterna  
 
[1] Den som är i behov av skydd skall få en fristad i vårt land. Alla ska ha rätt till 
en individuell och rättssäker prövning av sina asylskäl. Alla Sveriges kommuner skall 
ta ett solidariskt ansvar för flyktingmottagandet. Samtidigt måste EU:s 
medlemsstaters förmås ta ett mer solidariskt ansvar (Socialdemokraterna – 
Valmanifest, 2014).  
 
[2] Mottagningssystemet är ansträngt till sin fulla kapacitet och personalen går på 
knäna. Vi vill därför under en period minska antalet asylsökande som kommer till 
Sverige. Lagen ska tillfälligt anpassas till miniminivån i EU i syfte att fler ska välja att 
söka asyl i andra länder (Löfven, 2015-11-24). 
 
[3] This quote was originally in English, taken from the Government’s webpage. 
 
[4] Sverige har i den värsta flyktingsituationen sedan andra världskriget tagit ett 
större ansvar än något annat land i västvärlden. Vi är ett litet land som gör en enorm 
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insats och det svenska folket visar stor solidaritet i en svår tid. Vi värnar den 
internationella asylrätten. […] Därför föreslår nu regeringen en rad åtgärder för att 
skapa ett andrum för svenskt flyktingmottagande. (Regeringskansilet, 2015b) 
 
[5] Det måste råda ordning och reda i det svenska flyktingmottagandet. Det ska 
präglas av ansvarstagande, anständighet och raka vägar in i arbete. (Löfven – 
Sommartal, 2015-08-16).  
 
[6] Vi avvisar Sverigedemokraternas högerextrema drev mot invandrare. […] Vi 
står upp för en reglerad invandring och ett mottagande som gör att välfärden fungerar 
för alla. […] Här är vi jämlikar. Det är en självklar del av den svenska modellens 
framtid. (Löfven – Den svenska modellens styrka, 2016-03-12) 
 
[7] Och det vi skapar ska vara en välfärd som både tillgodoser varje människas 
behov av valfrihet och individuell anpassning (Löfven – Striden om den svenska 
modellen, 2016-02-29).  
 
[8] This quote was originally in English, taken from the Government’s webpage. 
 
[9] Vi behöver säkra kontrollen av vår yttre gräns, genomföra omfördelningar av 
flyktingar inom unionen […] där du söker asyl i EU, inte i ett enskilt land […] måste 
också ta ett genomensamt ansvar för asylmottagandet (Löfven – Den svenska 
modellens styrka, 2016-03-12). 
 
[10] Vi står upp för en reglerad invandring och ett mottagande som gör att 
välfärden fungerar för alla […] Här är vi jämlikar. Det är en självklar del av den 
svenska modellens framtid (Löfven – Den svenska modellens styrka, 2016-03-12) 
 
Moderaterna 
 
[11] Vi lever i en orolig tid, där människor tvingas fly för sina liv från krig och 
förtryck. Inte sedan Andra världskriget har så många människor varit på flykt. […] 
Många människor väljer att söka sig till vårt land. Alliansregeringen har, tillsammans 
med Miljöpartiet, valt en annan väg än den som många andra europeiska länder har 
valt. Istället för att sluta oss mot omvärlden har vi sagt att Sverige ska föra en human 
asylpolitik och vara en fristad för dem som flyr undan förföljelse och förtryck. Vi har 
visat att det är möjligt att sätta medmänskligheten i första hand och att öppna dörren 
för dem som behöver skydd (Moderaterna – Valmanifest, 2014). 
 
[12] Alliansen anser att Sverige blir bättre om fler flyttar hit för att bygga en bättre 
framtid. och jobba (Moderaterna – Valmanifest, 2014). 
 
[13] Det är uppenbart att regeringen saknar förmåga att ta kontroll över 
situationen […] omläggning av migrationspolitiken. […] ordning och reda i 
mottagandet. […] en grundläggande förutsättning för reglerad invandring är att ha 
 47 
 
kontroll över vilka som kommer hit. Det behövs tillfälliga uppehållstillstånd (Anna 
Kinberg Batra – Stämmotal, 2015-10-17).  
 
[14] […] Den som har fått avslag skall självklart heller inte, som det är idag, ha rätt 
till ersättning (Anna Kinberg Batra – Stämmotal, 2015-10-17).  
 
[15] Människor som fått en bild av vårt land som ett av världens bästa samhällen 
mötte ett svenskt samhälle där viktiga delar faktiskt just då inte fungerade (Anna 
Kinberg Batra – En plan för ett starkare Sverige, 2016-05-15). 
 
[16] […] det är naivt att tro att flyktingkrisen är över. Den kommer påverka oss 
under lång tid framöver. Flyktingströmmen till Sverige har just nu minskat. […] Vi 
behöver en tillfällig flyktingpaus och fortsatta kontroller vid våra gränser tills vi får 
ordning i vårt flyktingmottagande och kan hjälpa dem som behöver (Anna Kinberg 
Batra – En plan för ett starkare Sverige, 2016-05-15). 
 
 
